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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
At the advent of democracy in South Africa, the framers of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (Interim Constitution), introduced a multi-level 
government 1  (MLG) system. The MLG system 2  is found in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution). The MLG system created three spheres of 
government 3  with constitutionally assigned competences, as a response to internal 
pressure to decentralise power.4 The goal of the MLG system was to improve service 
delivery through the three spheres of government. In addition to the three spheres of 
government, the Constitution and various laws provided for independent state institutions 
that were meant to support the functioning of the MLG system. 
 
Whereas, there are a number of state institutions facilitating or assisting the MLG system, 
this paper focuses on the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC), the Municipal 
Demarcation Board (MDB) and the South African Heritage Resources Agency 
(SAHRA). It evaluates their internal organisation and functioning to see whether they 
positively contribute to or impede the objectives of the MLG system.  
 
The FFC is an independent5 constitutional advisory body mandated with advising and 
making recommendations to Parliament, Provincial Legislatures, organised local 
government and other Organs of State on financial and fiscal matters. Thus, the FFC is a 
key institution in intergovernmental fiscal relations.6 
 
                                                          
1 Constitutional  Element XVI. 
2 Section 40 (1) Constitution. 
3 Kohler-Koch B and Rittberger B ‘Review article: the governance turn in EU studies’ (2006) 
 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 34. 
4 Peters BG and Pierre J ‘Developments in intergovernmental relations: towards multi-level 
 governance’ (2001) 29 Policy and Politics 134 and Stephenson P ‘Twenty years  of multi-level 
 governance: where does it come from? what is it? where is it going?’ (2013) 20 Journal of  
 European Public Policy 828. 
5 Section 220 (2) Constitution. 
6 What is the FFC? http://www.ffc.co.za/index.php/about-ffc/what-is-the-ffc (accessed 20/11/2013). 
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The MDB is an independent, constitutional executive authority responsible for 
determining and re-determining municipal boundaries, delimiting wards for local 
government elections and assessing the capacity of municipalities to perform their 
functions.7 Thus, the MDB’s decisions affect the local, the provincial and the national 
spheres of government.   
 
SAHRA is a statutory organisation established under the National Heritage Resources 
Act 25 of 1999 (NHRA), as the national administrative body responsible for the 
protection of South Africa’s cultural heritage. It is a public entity in terms of Schedule 3A 
of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA). The Agency’s functions 
include advising, assisting and providing professional expertise to any authority 
responsible for the management of the national estate at provincial and local levels.8 
Therefore, the effectiveness and efficiency of provincial and local heritage authorities is 
linked to the functionality of the SAHRA.  
 
The first two deal with intergovernmental relations directly, the latter does not. While the 
first two directly deal with the MLG system, the latter facilitates the functioning of MLG 
within the Arts and culture sector. Whereas SAHRA is not a direct intergovernmental 
relations institution, it illustrates how a malfunctioning national body can adversely affect 
other heritage institutions from provincial and local government whose functioning 
depends on the Agency.  
 
It is crucial that state institutions are able to execute their own mandate in order for the 
end goals of the MLG system to be achievable. Generally, from an outsider’s perspective, 
the mandate execution is indicative of an institution’s efficiency and effectiveness. 
Effectiveness is defined as the degree to which objectives are achieved and the extent to 
which targeted problems are solved. Efficiency is measured by the quality and the time it 
takes to deliver the products or services.  However, there are external and internal factors 
which are controlled by different drivers that influence attainment of an institution’s end 
                                                          
7 Sections 155(3)(b) Constitution and 3(b) of the Municipal Demarcation Act 27 of 1998,   
Matatiele Municipality and others v President of the Republic of South Africa and others  
2006 (5) SA 47 (CC) paras 39-41, and Merafong Demarcation Forum and others v President 
of the Republic of South Africa and others 2008 (10) BCLR 968 (CC) para 297.  
8 Section 13(1) NHRA.  
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goals. The author will assess the effectiveness and efficiency of an institution through the 
elements of good governance.  
 
Whereas governance refers to processes whereby state institutions exert power and 
authority, influence and formulate policies, and make decisions concerning public life, 
economic and social development,9  there is no agreement on the definition of good 
governance. Nevertheless the quality of internal governance is measured based on 
adherence to the eight elements of good governance from the United Nations.10 In this 
study, the author groups the elements of good governance into four themes, which are 
further evaluated using indicators. 11  The four themes are effective leadership, the 
administrative harmony, 12  the economical and efficient use of resources 13  and the 
mandate execution or service delivery as outlined in the Constitution and enabling 
legislation.14 
 
The ability to execute an institutional mandate is dependent on effective leadership which 
is in a harmonious relationship with its implementing body as led by the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO). Generally, one has to look at the product or service delivered in order to 
find out the state of governance in an institution. The delivery of a poor product is a 
reflection of poor internal governance15 which manifests itself in ills such as financial 
mismanagement and official corruption that frustrate development goals.16 
                                                          
9 Ferreira-Snyman MP and Ferreira GM ‘Global good governance and good global governance’  
 (2006) 31 SAYIL 54-55. 
10 What is good governance? United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and 
 the Pacific http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp  
 (accessed 20/11/2013).  
11 Institute on governance Principles of good governance in the 21st century (2003) Policy   
 Brief No 15, Ottawa, Canada 3. 
12 Section 195 (1) (h) Constitution. 
13 Section 195 (1) (b) Constitution. 
14 Section 1(c) Constitution. 
15 Owoye O and Bissessar N ‘Bad governance and corruption in Africa: symptoms of  leadership 
 and institutional failure’ http://www.ameppa.org/upload/Bad%20Governance.pdf  (accessed  
 20/11/2013), Kanyam DA ‘Bad governance the bane of Africa’s underdevelopment’ Modern  
Ghana  31/10/2009 http://www.modernghana.com/news/246630/1/bad-governance-the-bane-of-africas-
underdevelopmen.html (accessed 20/11/2013) and Ologbenla DK ‘Leadership, governance and 
corruption in Nigeria’ (2007) 9 Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 97-98. 
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The leadership, as the decision-making body, influences the institution’s state of affairs, 
through its internal governance. As the controlling structure in an institution, the 
leadership must ensure that resources are used economically and efficiently in the 
execution of the mandate.17 The decisions made by the leadership must be implemented 
by the CEO who heads the implementing body. For a good product or service to be 
delivered in time, the Board and CEO must work together in harmony. This harmonious 
relationship should lead to a clean audit, which is indicative of sound internal 
governance. A clean audit means that an institution’s financial statements are free from 
material misstatements; there are no negative findings on reported performance 
objectives and compliance with legislation.18 A clean audit outcome indicates that the 
institution uses its resources economically and efficiently.  
 
However, there have been varied reports about poor internal governance in state 
institutions. A large number of state institutions are said to be dysfunctional and poorly 
governed. 19  This is attributed to external factors such as political interference 20  and 
internal factors such as corruption,21 conflict between the Board and the CEO,22 irregular 
                                                                                                                                                                             
16 Seemela P and Mkhonto X ‘Fundamentals of good governance in the public sector’ (2007) 
 42 Journal of Public Administration 208. 
17 Day C ‘Effective leadership and reflective practice’ (2000) 1Reflective Practice: International 
 and Multidisciplinary Perspectives 113. 
18    Audit terminology  http://www.agsa.co.za/Auditinformation/Auditterminology.aspx (accessed  
     20/11/2013). 
19 Presidential Review Committee State-owned entities volume 2 main report 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/report-of-the-Presidential-review-Committee-on-state-owned-entities-
may-2013-2013-05-29 (accessed 20/11/2013) and Parliament of the Republic of South Africa 
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the review of Chapter 9 and associated institutions (2007) 
A report to the National Assembly of the Parliament of South Africa, Cape Town, South Africa 
http://www.Parliament.gov.za/content/Chapter_9_report.pdf  (accessed 20/11/2013).  
20 Duncan J ‘SABC crises serve the interests of power elite’ Sunday Times 25/03/2013   
http://www.ru.ac.za/highwayafrica/articles/name,80191,en.html  (accessed 20/11/2013)  
and Skinner K ‘Critical SABC needed’ Sunday World 24/03/2013 
http://www.sundayworld.co.za/talk/2013/03/24/critical-sabc-needed (accessed 20/11/2013). 
21 ENCA ‘NYDA's future on the agenda at the state of the nation address’ ENCA 14/02/2013 
 http://www.enca.com/south-africa/nydas-future-agenda-state-nation-address  
 (accessed 20/11/2013). 
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expenditure,23 vacuum in leadership24 and boardroom tussles. It is apparent that the good 
governance requirements of the Constitution are not always adhered to. The 
consequences have been an inability to deliver good services or products. This 
undermines the integrity, public confidence and effective service delivery in the system 
of governance.25 
 
This raises the question whether the three independent institutions also fall into this 
category of dysfunctional state institutions, thus impacting negatively on the MLG 
system. 
 
2. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research paper seeks to answer the question of whether the FFC, the MDB and the 
SAHRA have assisted and facilitated the MLG system. Have they performed their 
functions effectively and efficiently? More specifically, have they functioned according 
to the elements of good governance? Has there been internal stability, financial probity, 
and compliance with the rule of law in the internal governance of the FFC, the MDB and 
the SAHRA? And if not, what has been the impact on the functioning of the system of 
MLG? 
 
3. ARGUMENT 
The FFC has assisted the MLG system through its execution of its mandate. The MDB 
has executed its constitutional mandate but not the statutory mandate and SAHRA has not 
executed its mandate.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
22 Skinner K ‘Critical SABC needed’ Sunday World 24/03/2013   
http://www.sundayworld.co.za/talk/2013/03/24/critical-sabc-needed (accessed 20/11/2013). 
23 Meeting of the Portfolio Committee: women on the Commission on gender equality strategic 
Plan 2013/14 briefing 05/06/2013 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20130605-Commission-gender-
equality-strategic-plan-201314-content-advisor-researchers-briefing (accessed  20/11/2013). 
24 Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on the review of the Chapter 9 and associated institutions 
 supporting constitutional   democracy 02/03/2007  http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20070301-
Commission-gender-equality-hearing (accessed 20/11/2013). 
25 Edwards T ‘Ethical fitness for accountable public officials: an imperative for good governance’  
 (2007) 42 Journal of Public Administration 29.  
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Both FFC and MDB have functioned reasonably well according to the elements of good 
governance, while SAHRA has not functioned effectively and efficiently. All three 
institutions have had problems which could jeopardise their internal governance, 
functionality and stability.  
 
4. LITERATURE SURVEY 
The available literature has much written about good governance, but very little about the 
functioning of state institutions and the three institutions under discussion.  
 
Several approaches have been followed in assessing good governance. Mpehle and 
Qwabe use an outcome-based governance approach in product delivery focusing on 
performance auditing for compliance with accountability in local government.26 Similarly 
Van der Nest et al looks at accountability of audit Committees as it affects the PFMA.27 
 
Fourie explores the use of performance management where he defines performance 
elements for effective governance and performance management in the public sector.28 
He agrees that good governance reflects the effective and efficient use of resources by 
management, but falls short of assessing the delivery of product and services.29 Naidoo 
and Dorasamy argue that good governance depends on ethical leadership, and direct their 
findings at leaders in their private capacity.30 
 
                                                          
26 Mpehle Z and Qwabe B ‘Performance auditing as means to entrench professional ethos in 
 the public sector: a South African local government perspective’ (2008) 43 Journal of Public 
 Administration 255-256. 
27 Van der Nest DP, Thornhill C and De Jager J ‘Audit Committees and accountability in the 
 South African public sector’ (2008) 43 Journal of Public Administration 545-558. 
28 Fourie DJ ‘The use of performance management for effective governance in public 
 administration’ (2012) 20 Administratio Publica 124-138. 
29 Fourie D ‘Institutional mechanisms and good governance: a perspective on the South  
 African public sector’ (2009) 44 Journal of Public Administration 1114-1123. 
30 Naidoo G ‘Ethical leadership elements in South African public administration lost  
 opportunity or alive with possibility’ (2012) 3 Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 
 106-126 and Dorasamy N ‘The impact of the global crisis on ethical leadership: a case study 
 of the South African public sector’ (2010) 4 African Journal of Business Management 2087-2096. 
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Generally, literature on governance caters for elements that could assist in identifying 
weaknesses, but the link between the weaknesses in governance and product delivery is 
not addressed.  
 
Cameron calls for a redefining of the political–administrative relationships. He reasons 
that the politicisation of the public service has contributed to poor service delivery.31 
Kuye and Mafunisa state that good leadership is ethical leadership. They define good 
leadership as the element of dynamic force that coordinates the organisation in the 
accomplishment of its objectives.32  They are of the opinion that the convergence of 
public duty with private interest has been the cause of unethical conduct. They assert that 
the performance of any organisation is directly related to the quality of its leadership. 
Thus, effective leaders will lead their institutions to greater heights of achievement, 
productivity and ultimately prosperity.33  
 
Kuye and Mafunisa state that the measurement of effective leadership is the extent to 
which the institution performs its tasks successfully and attains its objectives. Meeting 
tasks and objectives successfully can be accomplished within the template of an effective 
governance infrastructure.34  
 
Sindane and Nambalirwa argue that the absence of good governance and public 
leadership are the silent triggers of service delivery protests.35 However, their assessment 
is based purely on the reasons for service delivery-related protests in the local 
government sphere. Edwards is of the opinion that leadership incapacity and 
administrative challenges are impediments to ethical fitness in the public sector.36 
 
                                                          
31 Cameron R ‘Redefining political–administrative relationships in South Africa’ (2010) 
 76 International Review of Administrative Sciences 698. 
32 Kuye JO and Mafunisa MJ ‘Responsibility, accountability and ethics: the case for public  
 service leadership’ (2003) 38 Journal of Public Administration 431.  
33 Kuye JO and Mafunisa MJ (2003): 38 432.  
34 Kuye JO and Mafunisa MJ (2003): 38 433.  
35 Sindane AM and Nambalirwa S ‘Governance and public leadership: the missing links in  
 service delivery in South Africa’ (2012) 47 Journal of Public Administration 702-703. 
36 Edwards T (2007):42 30. 
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Generally, studies on governance have focused on the overall public sector, neglecting 
independent State institutions supporting government. None of the undertaken studies 
have tackled the internal governance of the FFC, the MDB and the SAHRA. No one 
researched the link between effective governance of an institution and the mandate 
execution.  
 
5. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research paper has relied heavily on documentary evidence, thus it involves the 
textual analysis of primary and secondary sources. The primary sources are the 
Constitution, enabling legislation and other publications which refer to the institutions’ 
mandate.  
 
Secondary sources such as writings from scholars have been used. Empirical data drawn 
from the institutions’ annual reports, the Auditor General of South Africa’s (AGSA) 
reports, public documents such as minutes and/or agenda (Parliamentary and 
institutional) have been examined.  
 
Both print and online media have been used, and views expressed in the newspaper 
articles have been taken to represent the perspectives of the person quoted in them. It also 
involve the reviewing and studying of key legal instruments applicable to good 
governance such as the King reports on corporate governance and the PFMA. The 
internet has been used for comparative analysis and for researching international 
standards.    
 
6. STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH PAPER 
Chapter 2 elaborates on the four themes of good governance against which the 
performance of the three institutions is measured. 
 
Chapter 3 then focuses on internal governance of the FFC. It examines the role, structure 
and functions set out by the Constitution and enabling legislation followed by an 
assessment of its performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
  9 
  
Chapter 4 covers governance of the MDB by examining its role, structure and functions 
as set out by the Constitution and enabling legislation followed by an assessment of its 
performance.  
 
Chapter 5 looks at governance of the SAHRA, examining its legislative role, structure 
and functions and making an assessment of its performance.  
 
Chapter 6 completes the study with conclusions and recommendations.  
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CHAPTER 2: GOOD GOVERNANCE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter focuses on the framework and concept of good governance. The value 
systems which will be assessed for good governance in subsequent Chapters are 
discussed.  The formal policies and principles outlining what is understood by the value 
systems under the four themes: effective leadership, administrative harmony, economical 
and efficient use of resources and mandate execution are outlined. 
 
In respect to this study, good governance should be understood as a machine with four 
themes. Each theme ought to function optimally on its own, and also with others. Each 
theme’s ability to function is influenced by other themes.  
 
Even though this study evaluates the four themes of good governance within the context 
of a state institution’s internal function, external factors such as institutional designers, 
society and the environment are mentioned for the sake of clarity. Internal functioning in 
a state institution cannot be isolated from external factors.  
 
Nzewi contends that the relationship between leadership and institutional effectiveness is 
related to the intentions of the institution designers who establish them.37 Burger is of the 
opinion that the environment and society nourishes the cycle of good governance as 
shown in figure 1 below. Thus, if society allows an institutional environment which is not 
conducive to the eradication of corruption or maladministration to exist, then the state 
institution will automatically feed off that environment as created by society.  
                                                          
37 Nzewi O ‘Governance and regional institutions: exploring designers’ intentions’ (2011) 
 46 Journal of Public Administration 697. 
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Figure 1: The influence of external factors on good governance. Source: Burger J 
(2006).38 
 
In short, an institution’s ability to adhere to elements of good governance is dependent 
on, and influenced by both external and internal factors. An institutional designer 
provides a conducive environment by structurally designing the institution correctly, in 
order for it to be able to adhere to the elements of good governance. If the institution is 
not functioning effectively and efficiently because of structural design, which can only be 
corrected externally, then the problem may also affect the internal governance of the 
institution. Therefore, depending on how an institution is designed, the elements of good 
governance may flourish or deteriorate.  
 
2. GOOD GOVERNANCE 
2.1 The universally accepted elements of good governance 
Initially the concept of good governance was invented by donor funders, such as the 
World Bank, to be used as borrowing conditions for developing countries which lacked 
sustainable economic growth. However there is a universal agreement that for 
governance system to be labelled as good it must adhere to eight major elements. It must 
be participatory; consensus orientated; accountable; transparent; responsive; effective and 
                                                          
38 Burger J Transform, perform … or just conform? evaluating SA public management reform  
 initiatives Inaugural lecture delivered on 25 April 2006, School of public management and  
 planning, Stellenbosch University 7.  
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efficient; equitable and inclusive; and follow the rule of law.39 Terms such as failed 
institutions have been used to describe institutions that do not adhere to the elements.40 
 
In recent years, the significance of the concept of good governance has grown, and 
various approaches have been created, in order to streamline the concept to achieve the 
aims and mandate of the driving institutions.  
 
The social approach emphasises that good governance involves ideas and values about 
how a state should act towards individuals.41 Thus, good governance should be promoted 
with the aim of establishing a legal order in which societal development can thrive, 
focusing on human rights and the rule of law. By conforming to good governance 
elements, there is a belief that an institution will be effective in developing the society, 
and ultimately enhance the fundamental freedom and rights of citizens.  
 
Of recent, the application of good governance varies and depends on the context and the 
nature, aim and mandate of the driving institution.  It is said that the approach can be 
modified on a need basis, taking into account the environment in which an institution 
functions.42 
 
The development of good governance has shifted its focus from effectiveness to 
legality, 43  because even an authoritarian government can be extremely effective in 
controlling a particular territory while blatantly ignoring all or most of the elements 
constituting good governance. However, since good governance is anchored in law, 
adherence begins with directors and management discharging their legal duties.44 
 
                                                          
39 What is good governance? United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia   
and the Pacific http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp 
(accessed 20/11/2013).  
40 Ferreira GM ‘Good governance and the failed state’ (2008) XLI CILSA 442-444. 
41 De la Harpe S, Rijken C and Roos R ‘Good governance’ (2008) 2 PER 4. 
42 Institute on governance Principles of good governance in the 21st century (2003) Policy   
 Brief No 15, Ottawa, Canada 3.  
43 Ferreira GM (2008): XLI 442-444. 
44 Khoza RJ and Adam  M The Power of governance: enhancing the performance of state-  
 owned enterprises (2005) 28. 
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The partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
group of States and the European community and its member States, of which South 
Africa is a member, requires that an institutional environment should be conducive to the 
promotion of good governance. This is indicative of the fact that certain values and 
principles must be upheld before the environment can accommodate the application of 
elements of good governance. 
 
In the context of an institutional environment that upholds human rights, democratic 
principles and the rule of law, good governance is the transparent and accountable 
management of human, natural, economic and financial resources for the purposes of 
equitable and sustainable development. It entails clear decision-making procedures at the 
level of public authorities, transparent and accountable institutions, the primacy of law in 
the management and distribution of resources and capacity building for elaborating and 
implementing measures aiming, in particular, at preventing and combatting corruption.45 
 
2.2 The new partnership for Africa's development 
The new partnership for Africa's development (NEPAD) is a strategic framework of the 
African Union, aimed at addressing the challenges of poverty and development in Africa. 
South Africa is a member state of the African Union and a founding member of 
NEPAD.46 
 
Part of the work of NEPAD includes a non-conditional African peer review mechanism 
performed on member states of the African Union, to promote and re-enforce high 
standards of governance. The peer review is a self-monitoring mechanism focusing on the 
promotion of democracy and good governance.47 
 
                                                          
45 Ferreira GM (2008): XLI 442-444. 
46 Founding member countries of  NEPAD included South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria,  
 Egypt and Senegal. NEPAD was adopted by African heads of state and government 
of the OAU in 2001 and was ratified by the African Union in 2002 About NEPAD 
http://www.nepad.org/about (accessed 20/11/2013). 
47 About NEPAD (accessed 20/11/2013). 
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2.3 The Constitution 
In addition to its principles and values, the Constitution directs that within public 
administration a culture of good governance 48  should be promoted by adhering to 
elements such as:  
 a high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained, 
 efficient, economical and effective use of resources must be promoted, 
 people’s needs must be responded to, 
 public administration must be accountable, 
 transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible and 
accurate information, and  
 good human-resource management/administrative harmony must be cultivated. 
 
2.4 King codes on good governance 
The various King reports and codes of good governance principles are aimed at 
promoting good corporate governance. Although the King codes are not legislation, it is 
declared that King III applies to all entities regardless of the manner and form of 
incorporation or establishment and whether in the public, private sectors or non-profit 
sectors.49 The principles in the reports are drafted so that even state institutions can apply 
them and, in doing so, achieve good governance.50 Hendricks and Wyngaard are of the 
opinion that any failure to meet a recognised standard of governance, even though not a 
legislated standard, may render a Board or individual member liable at law.51 
 
After the environment has been laid down by external factors such as the executive 
authorities, through structurally designing the institution to be able to absorb the elements 
of good governance, it then becomes a function of three things; direction and leadership, 
risk management and control, and accountability and reporting 52  to ensure the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the institution.  
                                                          
48 Section 195 (1) Constitution. 
49 Hendricks PSA and Wyngaard RG ‘South Africa’s King III: a commercial governance   
code determining standards of conduct for civil society organizations’ (2010) 12 The 
 International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law104. 
50 Hendricks PSA and Wyngaard RG (2010):12 104. 
51 Khoza RJ and Adam M (2005) 28. 
52 Khoza RJ and Adam M (2005) 33. 
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Direction and leadership refer to the quality of the organisation’s strategy, the calibre of 
the CEO charged with developing and implementing the strategy, and the calibre of the 
Board charged with supervision and overseeing. Risk management and control refer to 
the processes in place to identify, evaluate and monitor and control risks associated with 
the successful delivery of strategic and operational objectives which ensure sustainability.  
 
Accountability and reporting refer to adherence to the provision of a true, fair, and 
accurate account of the stewardship of the enterprise, in a transparent manner, to those 
with a legitimate interest. 53 Good governance is essentially about leadership for 
efficiency, leadership for probity, leadership with responsibility, and leadership that is 
both transparent and accountable.54 
  
                                                          
53 Khoza RJ and Adam M (2005) 33. 
54 Institute of directors in Southern Africa King report II on corporate governance for South   
 Africa (2002) South Africa 19. 
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3. THEMES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 
The four themes of good governance, with each having indicators will be used to assess 
good governance by using the various sources mentioned in table 1 below.  
 
Table 1: Themes, indicators and sources of good governance 
Value system  Indicators Sources 
Effective leadership 
Productive relationship 
between the Board members  
Vacant positions 
Acting positions    
Parliamentary proceedings 
and reports, annual reports, 
AGSA’s reports, media 
reports and the internet  
The administrative 
harmony 
Productive relationship 
between the Board members 
and the CEO  
Parliamentary proceedings 
and reports, media reports 
and the internet 
Economical and efficient 
use of resources 
The state of financial 
statements (clean audit, 
unqualified audit, qualified 
audit, adverse audit or 
disclaimer of audit) 
Annual reports, AGSA’s 
reports, media reports and the 
internet 
Mandate execution and 
product or service delivery 
The submission of 
recommendations and 
delivery of decisions on 
time 
Annual reports indicating 
submission of 
recommendations and 
outlining decisions made by 
three institutions  
 
The value systems indicated in table 1 above, are examined in order to find out if the four 
themes are connected, as shown in figure 2 below. The idea behind figure 2 is that if 
external and internal factors, which are further reduced to four themes are connected, then 
the institution will be in a position to assist or facilitate the MLG system, thus functioning 
within the elements of good governance. Where there is dis-connect of figure 2, then the 
institution will not be functioning effectively and efficiently.  
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Figure 2: Institutional flow graph showing how the themes of good governance feed each 
other. 
 
3.1 Effective leadership 
Whereas there are personal traits that distinguish leaders from the rest, effective 
leadership is judged by a leader’s ability to deliver products or services. In state 
institutions an effective leadership provides higher quality and more efficient goods and 
services.55 Effective leadership minimises cases of corruption, unauthorised, irregular, 
fruitless and wasteful expenditure, is responsive to the target market, which manifests 
itself in the execution of the institutional mandate. Thus, an effective leader leads an 
institution to flourish in delivering services and products.56 
 
As indicated by figure 3 below, the sophisticated technical management reforms are 
without effect as long as an organisational culture of poor tactical content is maintained.57 
What is required is a linkage between effective leadership and administrative harmony in 
order to execute the institution’s mandate, which is further elaborated on below.  
 
                                                          
55  Van Wart M ‘Public sector leadership theory: an assessment’ (2003) 63 Public   
 Administration Review 214. 
56 Boseman G ‘Effective leadership in a changing world’ (2008) Journal of Financial  
     Service Professionals 36. 
57 Burger J (2006) 16. 
Conducive 
environment
external factors -
intention of the 
institutional 
designer
Effective  
leadership
Administrative 
harmony 
Economical and 
efficient use of 
resources
Execution of 
mandate 
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Figure 3: How the relationship between effective leadership and administrative harmony 
affects the mandate execution. Source: Burger J (2006).58 
 
What Burger means is that without effective leadership which is in a harmonious 
relationship with its CEO, the mandate execution is impossible. The administrative 
harmony aspect is evaluated below.  The lack of delivery is ascribed to poor capacity in 
the fields of technical skills but even the extended application of these worthy 
management skills will not correct service delivery shortcomings as long as the tactical 
governance gap between leadership intent and managed operations remains. 
 
The mandate execution and/or objectives is a collective effort by all appointed leaders. 
Where there is a pattern of non-performance, non-willingness and lack of 
acknowledgement of consequences from a leader it can easily be copied by subordinates, 
to the detriment of the institution. The responsibilities of leadership must be understood 
with an emphasis on co-operation and solidarity. 59 Unity amongst the leaders and 
collective decision-making for the good of the institution 60  should resonate in an 
institution. Ineffective and unethical leadership is an impediment to good governance.61 
Effective leaders have a sense of responsibility, moral courage, judgement and integrity.62 
Most importantly, the decisions made by a leader must nurture the collective spirit of the 
institution for the good of its long-term health.63 
                                                          
58 Burger J (2006) 16. 
59 Khoza RJ and Adam M (2005) 54. 
60 Khoza RJ and Adam M (2005) 55. 
61 Pillay S ‘Corruption – the challenge to good governance: an SA perspective’ (2004) 17 
 The International Journal of Public Sector Management 587. 
62 Adair J Action-centred leadership (1973) 5. 
63 Harris P, Berendt CJ, Malindretos IN, Scoullis M and Williams R ‘Attributes of effective   
 leadership’ (2012) 5 Advances in Management 32. 
Governance  
Management 
Leadership  
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Through the example they set and the quality of decisions they make, leaders influence 
those under them to make judgements according to similar criteria. 64  Therefore an 
effective leader ought to have a combination of traits and appropriate knowledge, 
expertise and skills related to the functional field in which she works.65 
 
3.1.1 Vacant leadership positions 
The majority of studies have indicated that a vacant leadership position puts a strain on 
the effectiveness of an institution. Institutional performance has been shown to be at its 
lowest when there is an absence of a person giving direction.66The author will assess 
vacant leadership positions within the three institutions and its implications on the 
institutions’ execution of mandate. 
 
3.1.2 Acting leadership positions 
The question to be asked is how effective can a person in an acting position be when 
compared to a permanent leader? Generally, an acting person is occupying a position 
while there is still a search for a permanent leader, who is capable of fulfilling the task at 
hand, and therefore there is an assumption that the acting leader is incapable of 
performing the role.  
 
On a personal level, the person temporarily in a leadership position is likely to find a 
secure job somewhere else, to the detriment of the institution. Secure employment is 
crucial for one’s personal development and stability. An acting leader may feel 
inadequately empowered67 and might consider leaving the institution. Empowerment to 
make decisions may be unduly influenced by the external authority, something which 
might not so readily occur with a permanent leader.  
 
                                                          
64 Du Toit DFP, Van Der Waldt G, Bayat MS and Cheminais J Public administration and   
 Management for effective governance (1998) 122. 
65 Du Toit et al Public Administration and management for effective governance (1998) 185. 
66 Khurana R and Nohria N ‘The performance consequences of CEO turnover’ (2000)   
 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.219129 (accessed 20/11/2013). 
67 Billowitz A and Silverman JJ ‘The interim chairman role’ (1989) 16 Administration and   
 Policy in mental health 157. 
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3.1.3 Productive relationship between Board members 
Cady and Soukup state that what most often rules good governance in an institution is 
overcoming the challenges stemming from the personal interactions between Board 
members.68 Factors such as dominant personalities, egos, group factions, mismatch of 
skills and styles, and an absence of a sense of direction play a major part on the 
dysfunctionality of an institution. Accordingly, the biggest problem to be overcomed is 
the interpersonal relationships between Board members in order to have an optimally 
functioning institution.  
 
3.2 Administrative harmony 
Good administrative harmony is the backbone of each state institution. Stability within 
the CEO’s office is crucial for the attainment of the institution’s objectives as illustrated 
in figures 2 and 3 above. A non-harmonious relationship between the Board and the CEO 
affects the stability and functionality of an institution. The governance of a state 
institution requires harmony and convergence of the decision-made and the decision-
implementation in order to have a positive outcome. It thus requires that the Board and 
the CEO should be in accord, at all times.  
 
However, the CEO should not also fulfil the role of Chairperson of the Board.69For 
accountability and transparency, there should be a clear separation of functions of the 
duties performed by the CEO and the Chairperson. The CEO must be answerable to the 
Board. The CEO must only make those decisions that have been authorised by the Board, 
and not usurp functions of the Board. The CEO ought to bring any information that 
concerns the institution to the Board’s knowledge.  
 
3.2.1 Productive relationship between the Board and the CEO 
The most important relationship in governance is that between the Board and the CEO. 
The overall policy of the institution should be formulated and set by the full Board 
including the CEO, but implemented by the CEO. There should be clear lines of 
responsibilities, with the Board determining the strategic decisions and the CEO 
                                                          
68 Cady JH and Soukup WR ‘The ugly truth about Board relations’ (2008) ABA Banking   
 Journal 46. 
69 Principle 2.16 King report III. 
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developing various strategies to achieve the company’s main objectives.70 Monitoring 
and oversight should be tasked to the Board.  
 
The CEO is authorised to establish all further policies, make all decisions, take all 
actions, and develop all activities as long as they are consistent with any reasonable 
interpretation of the Board's policies.71 Because of the nature of the duties performed by 
the Board and the CEO, and for accountability and clear reporting lines, policy-makers 
should not at the same time be the implementers of the policy. Such dualism goes against 
the principles of separation of powers. A primary function of the Board is to monitor the 
CEO, which is impeded when the Chairperson of the Board also serves as the CEO.72 
There should be clear definition and separation of the roles and responsibilities of the 
Chairperson and the CEO to ensure that there is no friction.73 
 
3.3 Economical and efficient use of resources 
To promote accountability and transparency, an institution’s use of allocated resources is 
scrutinised and monitored by the AGSA, in order to assess whether the allocated 
resources are used as intended. The auditing of an institution’s financial statements is 
completed in order to ensure efficiency and economical use of public resources.  
 
3.3.1 The state of financial statements 
The AGSA’s audit is expressed as an opinion based on findings. It is regarded as a clean 
audit when a state institution’s financial statements are free from material misstatements. 
They are free from material misstatements when there are no negative findings on 
reported performance objectives and compliance with legislation.74 On the contrary, an 
unqualified audit with findings is one with negative outcomes reported on predetermined 
objectives or compliance with legislation, or both these aspects. 
                                                          
70 Khoza RJ and Adam M (2005) 62. 
71 Laughlin FL and Andringa RC Good governance for non-profits: developing principles   
 and policies for an effective Board (2007) 121.  
72 Daily CM ‘The relationship between Board composition and leadership structure and   
 bankruptcy reorganisation outcomes’ (1995) 21 Journal of Management 1046.  
73 Patricof AJ, Henderson D, Marcus B, Smale JG and Johnson DW ‘Redraw the line   
 between the Board and the CEO’ (1995) 73 Harvard Business Review162. 
74   Audit terminology http://www.agsa.co.za/Auditinformation/Auditterminology.aspx (accessed 
     20/11/2013). 
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A qualified audit means that the financial statements contain material misstatements in 
specific amounts, or there is insufficient evidence for the AGSA to conclude that specific 
amounts included in the financial statements are not materially misstated.75 
 
An adverse audit opinion means that the financial statements contain material 
misstatements that are not confined to specific amounts, or the misstatements represent a 
substantial portion of the financial statements.76 
 
A disclaimer of audit opinion is the worst of all AGSA’s opinions, because it means that 
the state institution provided insufficient evidence in the form of documentation on which 
to base an audit opinion. The lack of sufficient evidence is not confined to specific 
amounts, or represents a substantial portion of the information contained in the financial 
statements.77 
 
3.4 Mandate execution 
The primary test of good governance is whether an institution executes or performs its 
mandate. In the case of a state institution, the test is as to whether it provides the service 
that the Constitution or legislation requires.  
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Good governance in state institutions enhances the prospects of their fulfilling their 
constitutional or legislative mandate. Where they deal or are supportive of the MLG 
system, their proper functioning is essential for the health of the system. Effective 
leadership is the most important prerequisite for a conducive environment in a state 
institution.  An effective leader, who is the driver, sets the scene for the delivery of 
product/service on time, by adhering to elements of good governance.  It is emphasised 
that evidence of a well-functioning institution is the resultant product output/delivery of 
                                                          
75  Audit terminology http://www.agsa.co.za/Auditinformation/Auditterminology.aspx (accessed  
    20/11/2013). 
76  Audit terminology http://www.agsa.co.za/Auditinformation/Auditterminology.aspx (accessed 
    20/11/2013). 
77  Audit terminology http://www.agsa.co.za/Auditinformation/Auditterminology.aspx (accessed 
    20/11/2013). 
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product/service on time. A link was made between effective leadership, a conducive, 
harmonious environment, a well- functioning institution, and the resultant product output. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE FINANCIAL AND FISCAL COMMISSION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) owes its existence to the Interim 
Constitution which also provided for decentralisation without express details regarding 
how it should be achieved.78 The Commission’s basic functions were outlined in the 
Interim Constitution with procedures being left to be developed by the Commission itself 
during its foundation years.  
 
In 1995, the Commission produced the framework document for intergovernmental fiscal 
relations in South Africa, which contained a set of principles for the intergovernmental 
fiscal system. The framework document explored how the FFC's role and responsibilities 
were envisaged in the Interim Constitution and how these may be realised in practice.79 
 
This Chapter outlines the FFC’s legal framework. This is followed by an assessment of 
the FFC’s leadership’s effectiveness, good administrative harmony, the economical and 
efficient use of resources and execution of mandate.  
 
2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The FFC was initially established in terms of Section 198 of the Interim Constitution. 
However, Section 220(1) and (2) of the Constitution provides for it as an independent 
Commission, which is subject only to the Constitution and the law, and which must be 
impartial in the performance of its functions. 
 
Various enabling Acts such as the Financial and Fiscal Commission Act 99 of 1997 
(FFCA), which has since been amended by the Financial and Fiscal Commission 
Amendment Act 25 of 2003, and the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act 97 of 1997 
(IFRA), have been enacted to give effect to the constitutional requirements relating to the 
FFC, and to allow the Commission to perform its functions. 
                                                          
78 Melck AV and Gass C ‘The role of the FFC within the intergovernmental fiscal relations   
 system in South Africa – evolution, key successes and challenges’   
http://www.ffc.co.za/index.php/component/docman/doc_download/155-212-melck-a-v-gass-cthe-role-
of-the-ffc-20pp.html (accessed 20/11/2013).  
79   Melck AV and Gass C (accessed 20/11/2013). 
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2.1 Governance structure 
Initially the Constitution provided for an FFC comprising of twenty-two Commissioners. 
However, in 2001 a constitutional amendment which took effect in 2004, reduced the 
number of Commissioners to nine. The FFC Commissioners, who are appointed by the 
President, consist of a Chairperson, a deputy Chairperson, three persons selected after 
consulting the Premiers, two persons selected after consulting organised local 
government, and two other persons.80 
 
Presently, only the Chairperson is a full-time employee of the Commission. 81  The 
Commission must report regularly both to Parliament and to the Provincial Legislatures.82 
 
Section 221(2) of the Constitution requires the Commissioners to have appropriate 
expertise, which is understood to be expertise in intergovernmental fiscal relations system 
and matters.83 A Commissioner may be removed from office on grounds of misconduct, 
incapacity or incompetence. 84  The remuneration, allowances and other benefits of 
members of the Commission must be determined by the President, taking into account 
various factors, including recommendations from other institutions.85 
 
The Commissioners are appointed for a term not exceeding five years,86 although they are 
eligible for reappointment. A Commissioner may resign by giving at least three months’ 
written notice, but a shorter notice period in a specific case may be accepted. 87  An 
appointment to any vacancy on the Commission must be made not later than ninety days 
from the date when such vacancy occurs.88 The majority of the Commissioners constitute 
                                                          
80 Section 221 (1) Constitution.  
81 FFC’s annual report 2009-2010 14. 
82 Section 222 Constitution.  
83 Section 221(2) Constitution. 
84 Section 11(1) FFCA. 
85 Section 9(1) FFCA. 
86 Section 8(1) FFCA. 
87 Section 10 FFCA. 
88 Section 5(3) FFCA. 
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a quorum for a meeting of the Commission.89  A question before the Commission is 
decided with a supporting vote of at least two-thirds of the Commissioners present.90 
 
2.2 Mandate 
The Commission’s purpose is to advise and make recommendations to Parliament, 
Provincial Legislatures, organised local government and other Organs of State on 
financial and fiscal matters. Broadly, any laws that pertain to or affect intergovernmental 
fiscal relations91 must be enacted after sourcing the recommendations of, or consulting 
the Commission.   
 
In terms of Section 214 of the Constitution, the FFC must be consulted and any of its 
recommendations considered92 in the enactment of an Act of Parliament that provide for 
(a) the equitable division of revenue raised nationally among the national, provincial and 
local spheres of government;  (b) the determination of each province’s equitable share of 
the provincial share of that revenue; and (c) any other allocations to provinces, local 
government or municipalities from the national government’s share of that revenue, and 
any conditions on which those allocations may be made.    
 
The FFC’s recommendations should be submitted at least ten months93 (or a later date 
with an agreement between the Minister of finance and the Commission) before the start 
of each financial year. When the Minister of finance introduces the division of revenue 
bill, it must be accompanied by a memorandum explaining the extent to which account 
was taken of any recommendations of the FFC.94  
 
In terms of Section 228 of the Constitution, the FFC must be consulted and its 
recommendations considered 95  in the enactment of a national legislation regulating 
                                                          
89 Section 15(1) FFCA. 
90 Section 15 (2) FFCA. 
91 What is the FFC? (accessed 20/11/2013). 
92 Sections 214 (1) and 214 (2) Constitution, Section 9 IFRA, and Section 4 (4)(c) Money  
 Bills  Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act 9 of 2009 (MBAPRMA). 
93 Section 9 (1) IFRA. 
94 Section 10 (5) (b) IFRA. 
95 Section 228 (2)(b) Constitution and Section 3  Provincial Tax Regulation Process   
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provincial taxes. Furthermore the municipal fiscal powers and functions 96  given to 
municipalities must be regulated by national legislation enacted only after the FFC has 
been consulted, and its recommendations considered.97 
 
National legislation regulating the provinces’ ability to raise loans for capital or current 
expenditure98 must be enacted only after any recommendations of the FFC have been 
considered.99 Similarly, Section 230A of the Constitution calls for municipal loans which 
must be regulated by national legislation enacted only after the Commission’s 
recommendations have been considered.100 
 
In terms of 218 of the Constitution, an Act of Parliament guaranteeing any government 
loans may be enacted only after any recommendations of the FFC have been 
considered.101 In terms of Section 219 of the Constitution, an Act of Parliament in respect 
of remuneration of persons holding public office may only be passed after considering 
any recommendations of the FFC.102 
 
In addition, the FFC is mandated to submit recommendations for the medium-term 
expenditure framework (MTEF) 103  and the appropriations bill 104 as well as 
recommendations on the fiscal framework and revenue proposals.105 The Commission 
must also make financial and fiscal recommendations before any power or function106  of 
one sphere is assigned to an Organ of State in another sphere of government. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 Act 53 of 2001. 
96   Section 229 Constitution. 
97 Section 229 (5) Constitution. 
98  Section 230 Constitution. 
99 Section 230 (2) Constitution.  
100 Section 230A (2) Constitution. 
101 Section 218 (2) Constitution.  
102 Section 219 (5) Constitution.  
103 Section 4 (4)(c) MBAPRMA, the IFRA 97 of 1997 and Section 3 (1) of part one of the   
 FFC Amendment Act 25 of 2003. 
104 Section 4 (4) (2) MBAPRMA, and Section 3 FFCA of 1997. 
105 Section 4 (4) (c) MBAPRMA, and the FFCA (1997) as amended. 
106 Section (2A) (a) FFCA, Section 9 of the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, and Section 3 FFCA. 
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Therefore, the Commission’s functions are twofold: submission of recommendations and 
documents on a periodic basis, and provision of comments and advices on financial and 
fiscal policy issues on demand or request. 
 
3. EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP 
Effectiveness requires that the right Commissioners are appointed in order to meet the 
targets or execute the mandate. In respect to the FFC, effectiveness requires having 
Commissioners with expertise in intergovernmental fiscal relations. A Commissioners’ 
meeting would not be properly constituted unless there is a quorum.107 Furthermore, a 
question before the Commission must be decided with a supporting vote of at least two 
thirds of the Commissioners’ present.108  
 
3.1 Vacant Commissioners’ positions 
Although the law provides for a specific number of Commissioners, there have been 
periods or years when there have been vacancies in a number of positions, thereby 
affecting the effectiveness of the Commission. Graph 1 below shows the percentage of 
Commissioners in office for each financial year. The vertical axis represents the 
percentage of sitting Commissioners and the horizontal axis represents the financial 
years. The percentage of sitting Commissioners is indicated by the thick blue line across 
the graph.  
 
                                                          
107 Section 15 (1) FFCA.  
108 Section 15 (2) FFCA. 
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Graph 1: Commissioners' vacancy rate from 1994-2013. 
 
As indicated by graph 1, the most severe shortage of Commissioners was from 2003 to 
2004 and from 2012 to 2013. Those periods saw the Commission operating with the 
minimum number of Commissioners allowed by the FFCA. 
 
This was clearly problematic for the functioning of the Commission, because during the 
period 1994 to 2003, the Commission needed to have at least twenty out of twenty-two 
Commissioners to form a quorum. The problems of unfilled vacancies had previously 
been communicated to the President,109  however, as seen in subsequent years, 110  no 
resolution came out of the communication.  
 
On the implementation of the nine Commissioners’ structure in 2004 (as mentioned in 2.1 
above), the three persons appointed from a list of nominations agreed upon by the 
Premiers of the provinces and one person to be appointed by local government, were not 
appointed. The process of appointing the provincial and local government members was 
not complete and there were five serving Commissioners as of 31 March 2004.111 
                                                          
109 FFC’s annual report 1998–1999 5. 
110 FFC’s annual report 2002–2003 6. 
111 FFC’s annual report 2003–2004 1-2.  
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From 2005 to 2012, the Commission functioned with only six out of nine Commissioners. 
Reasons that could be advanced for such a situation include the fact that Commissioners’ 
allowances had not been reviewed since 2008.112 The recommendations in the report of 
the Ad Hoc Committee on the review of Chapter 9 and associated institutions (the Ad 
Hoc Committee) that the current system whereby the President determines the 
remuneration, conditions of employment and other benefits of Commissioners required 
revision, 113  were ignored. Even then, the report indicated that the determination of 
salaries was a lengthy process and a cause of some dissatisfaction among the 
Commissioners.114 By September of 2013 there were five continuing Commissioners115 
who were joined by three newly appointed Commissioners. 116  Currently the 
determination of salaries, whether a Commissioner is hired on a part-time or full-time is 
bestowed to the President.    
 
If the main aim for the reduction of the twenty-two Commissioner structure was to bring 
about efficiency and effectiveness, the plan has failed. The nine Commissioners structure 
has not made filling vacancies easier because, even with a reduced number, a pattern of 
unfilled positions persists.  
 
3.2 Chairperson 
The Chairperson of the Commission is mandated with leading the Board of 
Commissioners, administration and staff matters as the CEO, which includes the carrying 
out of the decisions of the Commission117 and financial responsibilities as the accounting 
officer.118 
 
                                                          
112 FFC’s annual report 2010–2011 9.  
113 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee 61. 
114 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee 61. 
115 FFC’s annual report 2012-2013 61.  
116 President Zuma appoints new FFC members 02/09/2013   
 http://www.presidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=16027 (accessed 20/11/2013). 
117 Section 19 (2) (d) FFCA. 
118 Section 24 FFCA. 
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The Commission’s inaugural Chairperson served two terms. His successor was in office 
from July 2004 until July 2005.119 Her term of office was meant to end in June 2009. The 
third Chairperson was appointed to serve from August 2005 to August 2010.  The current 
acting Chairperson/CEO has moved through the ranks of the Commission. He started as a 
researcher, served as a programme manager, and became a Commissioner and deputy 
Chairperson in 2008. He took over the role of an acting Chairperson in September 
2010.120 His first term as acting Chairperson expired on February 2013 but was extended 
to February 2015.  
 
3.3 Productive relationship between the Commissioners 
Over the years, the relationship between the Commissioners seems to have been 
harmonious. However, the report of the Ad Hoc Committee indicates that there have been 
a few significant internal conflicts. 121  It is reported that the conflicts were more 
procedural, flowing from a lack of formal guidance on the delineation of powers, roles 
and responsibilities between full-time and part-time Commissioners. In this instance, the 
Committee recommended that a more formal delineation of the powers, roles and 
responsibilities of Commissioners was required.122 
 
4. THE ADMINISTRATIVE HARMONY 
The general practice is that the CEO should not also play the role of a Chairperson of an 
institution.123 This brings about challenges for sound institutional governance, since the 
directing authority and the implementing authority are vested in the same person. The 
Chairperson is the link between the Board and management and particularly between the 
Board and the CEO. Therefore the Chairperson ensures that the Board’s decisions are 
executed. The Board should appoint the CEO.   
 
However, different from the general practice the FFC has confined both the CEO and 
Chairperson roles to one person, as reflected below.  
                                                          
119 Loxton L ‘Mokate to head the fiscal Commission’ The Star 20/06/2004. 
120 FFC’s annual report 2012-2013 19.  
121 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee 61.  
122 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee 62.  
123 Institute of directors in Southern Africa King report II on corporate governance for South 
     Africa (2002) South Africa 18. 
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4.1 Conflation of the Chairperson and the CEO positions 
The collective responsibilities of management vest in the CEO, consequently he/she bears 
the ultimate responsibility for all management functions. The Commission delegates to 
management via the CEO, who will in turn delegate to those reporting to him. Thus, the 
link between other senior management and staff is the CEO. In delegating authority, the 
Commission should establish benchmarks and performance indicators to hold 
management, specifically the CEO, accountable for decisions and actions delegated to 
him/her.    
 
From establishment, the general practice of separation of the Chairperson and CEO 
positions was not considered. Even though there is no evidence of the previous office 
holders complaining about this combination, it is submitted that there is a need for 
separation. The amendment of the FFCA in order to remedy the conflation of the two 
positions, which is in conflict with the PFMA and antithetical to the prescripts of good 
governance practice remains unresolved, and has been on the Commission’s executive 
authority agenda for a few years. However, the Minister of finance as the executive 
authority has not amended the FFCA.   
 
4.2 Productive relationship between the CEO and the Commissioners 
Because the CEO and Chairperson positions are held by the same individual, conflicts 
arise in the course of performing functions the two positions. Of recent, the conflation has 
hampered effectiveness because, as reflected in the AGSA’s reports, 124  the acting 
Chairperson seems to be battling with fulfilling the requirements of both positions, 
                                                          
124 In the FFC’s annual report 2010-2011 page 100 the AGSA said that “the accounting officer  
      did not exercise adequate oversight over the financial statements, report on predetermined 
      objectives and the compliance process resulting in material adjustments to the financial  
      statements, findings on predetermined objectives, and non-compliance with  laws and 
      regulations”. In the FFC’s annual report 2011-2012 page 108 the AGSA said that “management 
     did not implement proper controls to ensure that the annual financial statements are free from 
     material misstatements” and in the FFC’s annual report 2012-2013 page 66 the AGSA said 
     that “the accounting officer did not exercise sufficient oversight responsibility ensuring compliance 
     with laws and regulations as the normal competitive bidding procedures were not followed related 
    to procurement and contract management. Internal control deficiencies resulted in irregular expenses”. 
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coupled with the fact that the number of sitting Commissioners was also at its minimum 
as opposed to previous years. 
 
5. ECONOMICAL AND EFFICIENT USE OF RESOURCES 
Graph 2 below reflects the AGSA’s audit opinions on the FFC’s financial affairs from 
1996 to 2013. The vertical axis represents the audit outcomes and the horizontal axis 
represents the financial years. The audit opinions received for the financial years are 
reflected by the blue thick line across the graph.   
 
Graph 2: The FFC's audit outcomes from 1996-2013 
 
There are no public records of the Commission’s audit outcomes from 1993 to 1996. Of 
major concern is the Commission’s inability to comply with legislation,125  which is 
reflected by internal control deficiencies. The deficiencies stem from the initial non-
establishment of, or non-operational 126  internal audit function, the lack of a fraud 
                                                          
125 Section 38 (1) (a) (ii) PFMA. 
126 FFC’s annual report 2001–2002 49. 
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prevention plan127 as well as late submission of financial statements128 and non-approval 
for certain agreements requiring the intervention of the executive authority.129 
 
In some years 130  the non-compliance with legislation has led to a threat to the 
Commission’s ability to operate as a going concern, because its current liabilities 
exceeded its total assets. The Commission has had unauthorised,131 including fruitless, 
wasteful and irregular expenditure,132 specifically because of non-compliance with the 
supply chain, procurement and contract management.  
 
The Commission’s inability to comply with laws and regulations has been a stumbling 
block to its attaining clean audits. As compliance pertains to oversight by the 
Commission, the results indicate that there is some disconnect between the oversight role 
on the part of the Commission and the CEO as the implementer, which can be attributed 
to the conflation of the CEO/Chairperson roles.133 
 
6. MANDATE EXECUTION 
The Commission’s mandate execution will be evaluated by assessing submission of 
recommendations and inputs on the MTEF budget cycles, the division of revenue bills, 
and the appropriations bills.  
 
Graph 3 below depicts the Commission’s mandate execution from inception until 2013. 
The vertical axis represents the years and the horizontal axis represents the score 
barometer. The score barometer indicates the submission or non-submission of the 
recommendations. The score barometer is classified into four ratings: 100% (submission 
                                                          
127 Section 3.2.1 Treasury regulations. 
128 FFC’s annual report 2000–2001 24-25. 
129 Section 66 (4) PFMA. 
130 FFC’s annual report 2006-2007 43, FFC’s annual report 2010-2011 118, FFC’s annual  
 report 2011–2012 128 and FFC’s annual report 2012-2013 87. 
131 FFC’s annual report 2010-2011 97. 
132 FFC’s annual report 2009-2010 95, FFC’s annual report 2010-2011  97 FFC’s annual 
 report 2011-2012 120 and FFC’s annual report 2012–2013 88. In contravention of  
 Section 40 (1) PFMA, Treasury  regulation 16A6.1 and Practice note 8 of 2007/08  
 paragraph 3.4.1 and Treasury regulation 16A9.1 (d) relating to supply chain management. 
133 FFC’s annual report 2012–2013 66. 
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on time); 60–80% (late submission because of external factors); 30–50% (late submission 
because of internal factors); 0–20% (non-submission). 
 
Graph 3: The FFC's mandate execution from 1995-2013. 
 
The Commission delivered its first set of recommendations on the equitable division of 
national revenue134 in 1995. As shown on graph 3, from 1995 to 2013 the Commission 
has successfully executed its mandate, without failure. Submissions for the MTEF budget 
cycles, the annual division of revenue bills and the appropriations bills were submitted, 
on time. 
                                                          
134 Melck AV and Gass C (accessed 20/11/2013). 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
1994-1995
1995-1996
1996-1997
1997-1998
1998-1999
1999-2000
2000-2001
2001-2002
2002-2003
2003-2004
2004-2005
2005-2006
2006-2007
2007-2008
2008-2009
2009-2010
2010-2011
2011-2012
2012-2013
2013-2014
Score Barometer
Sources: Financial Statements 1996-1997,  Annual Reports 1997-2013,  Parliamentary Meetings 
and Websites.
F
in
an
ci
al
 Y
ea
rs
Graph 3: The FFC's mandate execution from 1995-2013
Submission for the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), which was introduced in 1998.
Annual Submission for the Appropriations Bill.
Annual Submisssion for the Division of Revenue Bill.
 
 
 
 
  36 
  
 
Throughout the years, the Commission’s recommendations and advice have been well 
received.135 According to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee, by 2007, the Commission 
had a seventy per cent acceptance rate of its recommendations.136 This is an indication of 
the calibre of leadership, knowledge and expertise within the Commission.  
 
Furthermore it should be noted that generally the Commission’s recommendations are in 
line with the government policies of the day. Thus, the recommendations may not 
necessarily be immediately implemented, because by their very nature they are long term 
plans, requiring a collective effort, planning and adjustment of plans by various 
stakeholders.  
 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Throughout the years, the Commission has successfully executed its mandate, which is 
testament to the calibre of leadership it has had over the years.  
 
However, the non-appointment of Commissioners as it pertains to effective leadership, 
and the conflation of CEO/Chairperson roles as it pertains to administrative harmony, 
which are out of control of the Commission, are concerning.  
 
Vacant positions which have been cushioned by the calibre of leadership in place are a 
concern. The impact of such vacancies may not be immediately felt, but should the 
situation remain the same, the stability of the Commission might be in jeopardy. The 
Commission has highlighted the problems of unfilled vacancies to the President since 
August 1999.137 Co-ordination of the functions of the three spheres of government in the 
appointment and nomination has not been smooth. The issue of the Commission never 
having a full bench of Commissioners has been normalised. The answer lies in the co-
                                                          
135 Minutes of the select Committee: appropriations on local government fiscal framework,   
equitable share formula: FFC reports 22/05/2013 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20130522-local-            
government-fiscal-framework-equitable-share-formula-financial-fiscal-Commission-reports 
     (accessed 20/11/2013). 
136 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee 58. 
137 FFC’s annual report 1998–1999 5. 
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ordination of activities between the different stakeholders that nominate and appoint 
Commissioners. 
 
The Chairpersonship has been vacant for over three years. The conflation of the 
Chairperson and CEO positions, allied with the workload that these positions carry, is 
concerning and does not promote good governance. There is a need to have checks and 
balances in the exercise of authority138 as this matter impacts on the delivery of services 
by the Commission. The President should intervene in the appointment of the 
Commissioners. The Minister of finance, as the executive authority, should also play his 
role in addressing the current structural challenges within the Commission.  
 
When assessed on the execution of mandate only, the Commission has successfully 
executed its mandate. However, statistically, the FFC has obtained more unqualified 
audits with findings than clean audits. The transition from an unqualified audit to a clean 
one depends largely on the separation of the CEO and Chairperson roles, in order to 
allow the appointees to focus on a single role, at a time.  
 
Even though the result of the convergence of the CEO/Chairperson roles is antithetical to 
the prescripts of good governance, it also has direct bearing on the lack of oversight at the 
FFC. It is impossible for one individual to perform both roles satisfactorily, taking into 
consideration that the Chairperson should play an oversight role on the CEO. This has 
resulted in non-compliance with the various legislative prescripts on good governance 
and non-adherence with the PFMA and internal controls.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
138 FFC’s annual report 2012–2013 61.  
 
 
 
 
  38 
  
CHAPTER 4: THE MUNICIPAL DEMARCATION BOARD 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
When the first democratic government came into power in 1994 it was faced with the 
major task of restructuring spatial matters and rationalising the local government sphere. 
Until then, the local government sphere was geographically and spatially separated along 
racial, social and economic lines. To run the process of transformation through redrawing 
municipal boundaries, the Constitution established an independent authority, the 
Municipal Demarcation Board (MDB).  
 
While the MDB has been mandated to fulfil its functions independently, the process must 
be informed by the criteria, factors and objectives outlined in Sections 24 and 25 of the 
Municipal Demarcation Act 27 of 1998 (MDA).  
 
In this regard, this Chapter outlines the MDB’s legal framework, assesses the Board’s 
leadership’s effectiveness, administrative harmony, economical and efficient use of 
resources and execution of mandate.  
 
2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
The MDB is a constitutional institution, whose functions, roles and composition are set 
out in the Constitution and various Acts. In giving effect to the constitutional   
directive,139 the MDA was enacted. The Act provides for a Board which is independent, 
impartial and performs its function without fear, favour or prejudice.140 
 
2.1 Governance structure 
The Board must consist of no fewer than seven and no more than ten members.141 An 
appointment should be based on qualification or experience or knowledge appropriate to 
the functioning of the MDB.142 The appointment process consists of a public invitation 
issued by the executive authority (Minister of local government), followed by 
                                                          
139 Section 155 (3) Constitution. 
140 Section 3 MDA. 
141 Section 6 (1) MDA. 
142 Section 7 (1) MDA.  
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recommendations from a selection panel,143 and appointment by the President. A member 
is appointed for five years without any restriction on the number of terms that may be 
served.144 The Board is accountable to Parliament.145 The Board appoints the manager of 
the Board/CEO/accounting officer, who holds office for an agreed term not exceeding 
five years, but which is renewable.146 
 
2.2 Mandate 
The MDB’s main function is the determination and re-determination of municipal outer 
and inner boundaries147 in accordance with the MDA and other appropriate legislation 
enacted in terms of Chapter 7 of the Constitution.148 
 
After every municipal election, municipal boundaries are reviewed. The process of 
demarcation requires involvement of stakeholders such as the Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC) and the Minister of local government. On finalisation of changes to 
municipal outer-boundaries by the MDB, they are handed over to the IEC so that the 
Commission can delimit voting district, register voters and for the national common 
voters roll to be divided into municipal segments for the national and provincial elections. 
 
On completion of outer boundaries, wards are delimited for the next local elections. In 
terms of Item 4 of Schedule 1 of the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 (MSA), the 
MDB after consulting the IEC must delimit a municipality into wards, with each ward 
having approximately the same number of voters. The process is preceded by the 
publication by the Minister of local government of a formula to determine the number of 
Councillors for municipal Councils. This is followed by the Members of the Executive 
Council’s (MECs) determination of the number of Councillors for each municipality in 
their provinces. Thereafter, the determination of the number of wards and delimitation of 
ward boundaries is undertaken by the Board. This process is finalised by a handover of 
the wards to the IEC by the MDB, for preparation of municipal elections.  
                                                          
143 Section 8 (1) (b) MDA.  
144 Section 9 (1) and (2) MDA. 
145 Section 39 MDA. 
146 Section 32 MDA. 
147 Section 155 (3) (b) Constitution and Section 21 MDA. 
148 Section 155 (3) (b) Constitution and Section 4 MDA.  
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The Board has a statutory function, which involves the performance of capacity 
assessments for local and district municipalities in terms of the MSA, in order to advise 
MECs on whether certain powers should be reallocated between districts and local 
municipalities.149 
 
3. EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP 
Effective leadership is linked to the Board’s ability to execute its mandate. It is the ability 
to deliver decisions on time. This ability is influenced by the MDB having a fulltime 
Chairperson in place, at all times, enough Board members to carry out the tasks of the 
Board and a harmonious relationship between the members, which are assessed below.  
 
3.1 Vacant Members’ positions 
Graph 4 below indicates the percentage of members in office for each financial year. The 
vertical axis represents the percentage of members and the horizontal axis represents the 
financial years. The full Board is indicated by 100 per cent and a lower percentage 
indicates unfilled positions. 
                                                          
149 Section 85 MSA. 
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Graph 4: Members' vacancy rate from 1999-2013. 
 
The first Board consisted of eleven members, 150  but a member resigned during that 
financial year, leaving the Board with a full-time Chairperson and nine part-time 
members.  
 
It is assumed that between 2001 and 2002 the executive authority altered the number of 
Board members in terms of Section 6 (2)(a) of the MDA, and decided that the Board 
continue functioning with nine members, because none of the available records indicates 
a resignation/death of a member from the ten members mentioned in 2001. However, the 
2001–2002 annual report states that a member took official leave to study, leaving the 
Board to function with a full-time Chairperson and seven part-time members.151 
 
The second Board, consisting of nine members was appointed in February 2004. The 
third Board, consisting of ten members took office in February 2009.  
                                                          
150 MDB’s annual report 1999–2001 2 and Legislation governing the demarcation process   
http://www.cogta.gov.za/subwebsites/publications/dermacation/dm6.htm 
(accessed 20/11/2013). 
151 MDB’s annual report 2001–2002 1. 
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The Board should consist of no fewer than seven and no more than 10 members.152 
During the 2012 to 2013 financial year the Board operated with seven Board members. 
This means that if one of the Board members were to resign or die, the Board would not 
be legally constituted. This would render the Board inactive and its decisions invalid.   
 
3.2 Chairperson 
With the exception of the period 2002/2003 to February 2004 the Board has always had a 
full-time Chairperson. During the 2002 to 2003 financial year, the Chairperson vacated 
office as a full-time member and joined the Board as a part-time member. Thus, from the 
time of the Chairperson’s departure until the second Board’s appointment in February 
2004, the Board did not have a Chairperson, nor a full-time member in office.  
 
3.3 Productive relationship between the Board members 
Overall, the relationship between the members seems to have been harmonious over the 
years.  
 
The general impression from the data obtained is that the MDB has an effective 
leadership in place, but on closer look it is clear that the Board’s ability to function 
effectively within the legal boundaries set out in the enabling Act153 might be negatively 
affected if it continues to function with the minimum allowed members. The unfilled 
vacancies should be dealt with immediately for the functioning of the Board to be 
strengthened. It is also the opinion of the author that there is a need to increase the 
number of full-time members.  
 
4. ADMINISTRATIVE HARMONY 
The Board appoints a manager to be the CEO and accounting officer for the Board.  The 
appointment is on a contractual term not exceeding five years, but which may be re-
newed.154 
 
                                                          
152 Section 6 (1) MDA. 
153 Section 6 (1) MDA. 
154 Section 32 (2) (a) MDA.  
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4.1 Productive relationship between the Board members and the CEO 
The first CEO appointee was dismissed in 2000 after being found guilty of gross 
misconduct.155 Consistency and stability reigned with the second appointee holding the 
position for two terms, leaving on expiration of his contract in 2011.  
 
During the period 2011 to 2012, the Board appointed one of its part-time members to be 
acting CEO whilst finalising the appointment of a new CEO.156  However, it should be 
remembered that the Board hires, fires, and evaluates the CEO. In effect, the Board as a 
collective is the CEO’s supervisor.  For the same individual to be voting on the Board and 
influencing decisions about his role creates a conflict of interest. If the CEO were able to 
sway Board decisions by voting, the Board's independent role in supervising the CEO is 
at risk. The Board also sets the CEO’s salary, so it clearly doesn't make sense for the 
CEO to vote on that decision.  
 
Assuming that the CEO could recuse himself from discussions that involve him 
personally, the appropriateness and practicality of this would be limited. As the senior 
official, the CEO already wields a great deal of power. He is likely to be better informed 
than others on institutional matters. The CEO controls much of the flow of information to 
the Board and, for the most part, controls the recruitment of staff.157 The question arises if 
the Board would be decisive in taking actions against one of their own should a situation 
of gross misconduct occur under his tenure. 
 
Overall, the Board has had harmonious relationships with their CEOs, with the exception 
of the first appointee. The ability of the first Board to take decisive steps against 
misconduct indicates its ability to promote an institutional environment which adheres to 
elements of good governance, in order to alleviate any occurrence of similar episodes. 
However, the hiring one of its own members as a CEO by the third Board indicates poor 
judgement.  
 
                                                          
155 MDB’s annual report 2002–2003 1-3.  
156 MDB’s annual report 2012–2013 10.  
157 Rosenblatt B ‘Should the CEO have a vote on the Board’ 
      http://www.compasspoint.org/Board-cafe/should-ceo-have-vote-Board 
     (accessed 20/11/2013). 
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5. ECONOMICAL AND EFFICIENT USE OF RESOURCES 
Graph 5 below, shows the Board’s use of financial resources throughout its existence. 
The vertical axis indicates audit outcomes received for each financial year and the 
horizontal axis shows the financial years. The audit outcomes are indicated by the thick 
blue line across the graph.  
  
 
Graph 5: The MDB's audit outcomes from 1999-2013. 
 
5.1 Graph analysis 
With exception of the period 2004 to 2005, the MDB has received and sustained 
financially unqualified audits, with findings raised on reporting of predetermined 
objectives and non-compliance with legislation, over the years.  
 
From establishment the Board has battled to comply with laws158  and regulations159 
applicable to internal control measures, as well as with setting up systems for monitoring 
and management of assets in place and, so far, this pattern has resulted in the Board’s 
inability to obtain a clean audit.160 
 
                                                          
158 Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 and Section 40 (1) (c) PFMA. 
159 National treasury regulations of 2005 and national treasury instruction note of 15 September 
 2010, treasury regulation 16A and supply chain management practice notes issued by the  
 National Treasury, treasury regulation 13.2. 
160 AGSA’s report 2005–2006 147 and 149 and MDB’s annual report 2008–2009 1.   
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In recent years, the Board’s supply chain, procurement and contract management has led 
to procurement of goods/services without following the correct procedure and internal 
controls, therefore resulting in irregular expenditure.161 The situation prompted the Select 
Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) to pass a resolution requiring the MDB to 
ensure that procurement is in line with the treasury regulations and that proper 
information technology and system controls are established. 162  Subsequent to the 
resolution there are still challenges with the internal audit function which does not 
comply with the requirements of some of the treasury regulations.163   
 
In previous years, the Board’s liabilities exceeded its assets, thus it operated at a deficit, 
which threatened its ability to continue as a going concern.164 
 
The MDB’s lack of ability to move to a clean audit is influenced by the degree to which it 
complies with laws and regulations, specifically on expenditure, procurement, and supply 
chain management. As attested by AGSA, the lack of progression towards clean 
administration can be attributed to management developing action plans which do not 
address the root cause of the findings reported; actions not being specific and/or failure to 
assign responsibility for tasks; and/or timelines not being determined for ultimate 
resolution of internal and external audit findings.165 
 
6. MANDATE EXECUTION 
Generally, the MDB follows two cycles between local government elections; namely, 
municipal boundary redetermination (re-alignment and adjustment, consolidation and 
annexation or amalgamation and re-categorisation) and ward delimitations. The 
municipal capacity assessments are an annual occurrence, completed when there is a need 
or upon a request.  
 
                                                          
161 MDB’s annual report 2006–2007 6, AGSA’s report 2005–2006 147 and 149, AGSA’s   
report 2008–2009 16 and 42, MDB’s annual report 2011–2012 44-46, MDB’s annual  
report 2012–2013 45-46 and MDB’s annual report 2009–2010 40. 
162 MDB’s annual report 2006–2007 7. 
163 AGSA’s report 2011–2012 30.  
164 MDB’s annual report 2006–2007 5 and AGSA’s report 2004–2005 138. 
165 AGSA’s report 2011–2012 29 and 30.  
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As shown on graph 6 below, the Board’s mandate execution is evaluated by assessing 
decisions made on the determination of municipal boundaries, the delimitation of wards 
and assessment of municipal capacity. An execution of the mandate is reflected by ten per 
cent, whilst a lower percentage reflects non-attainment. The MDB’s first annual report 
covers the period from 1999 to 2001.  
 
Graph 6: The MDB's mandate execution from 1999-2013. 
 
Since the Board’s establishment there have been three municipal elections, which were 
held in December 2000, March 2006 and May 2011. These are reflected by a yellow 
colour on graph 6 above. Following the elections, reviews of municipal boundaries 
commenced in January 2001, April 2006 and June 2011 respectively.  
 
The Board’s first major demarcation process led to a reduction from 843 to 284 
municipalities consisting of six metropolitans, 47 districts, and 231 local municipalities as 
well as a delimitation of 3 754 wards.166 For the 2006 elections, the demarcation process 
                                                          
166 Mlokoti V ‘On spatial re-configuration in South Africa and the value of an independent   
demarcation body’ in Steytler N (ed) Municipal Demarcation Board 10th year celebration:  
the first decade of the Municipal Demarcation Board: some reflections on demarcating  
local government in South Africa (2009) 3. 
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resulted in the determination of two new metropolitan municipalities, which were initially 
meant to have been three,167 and 3 895 delimitated wards.    
 
The MDB handed over final municipal wards to the IEC on 1 September 2010, for 
preparations for the 2011 local government elections.168 There were 4 277 delimitated 
wards which were contested in the eight metropolitans, 45 districts and 231 local 
municipalities. 
 
The past three local government elections which were followed by reviews of municipal 
boundaries have attested to the Board’s ability to always deliver on its mandate without 
delay.  
 
6.1 Independence of the Board 
Independence presupposes that the Board’s decisions may not be subject to amendments 
or be vetoed by anyone, including government.   
 
In recent years, there have been court cases169 by communities and events that have 
questioned the Board’s independence in decision-making. However, the courts’ rulings 
have pointed to an independent Board which accurately follows the guidelines in the 
Constitution and enabling legislation. 
 
The question of how the Board makes its decisions was first mentioned in the Matatiele 
case, whereby the constitutionality of the twelfth constitutional amendment Act, which 
resets the provincial borders, and the cross-boundary municipalities laws repeal and 
related matters Act, which realigns the boundaries of the affected municipalities, was 
questioned. It was argued that in passing the two bills, Parliament exceeded its powers 
                                                          
167 Mlokoti V (2009) 4. 
168 MDB hands over municipal ward for the 2011 local government elections   
http://www.buffalocity.gov.za/municipality/mediaroom/2010/demarcation_Board.pdf  
(accessed 20/11/2013). 
169Matatiele Municipality and others v President of the Republic of South Africa and others   
2006 (5) SA 47 (CC) paras 40 and 105 and Merafong Demarcation Forum and others v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and others 2008 (10) BCLR 968 (CC)  
paras 4 and 297.  
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because, although it may legally demarcate provinces, the demarcation of municipalities 
is the preserve of the constitutionally independent MDB.170 
 
Recently, there have been queries about the independence and operations of the Board. 
Some of the ruling party’s members appear to be concerned about the MDB and have 
accused the Board of drawing up boundaries that put their party at a disadvantage.171 This 
has resulted in the ruling party urging the government to review the MDB’s role, 
functions, scope and composition as well as the criteria it uses to decide ward and 
municipal boundaries.172 By late 2012, a Ministerial demarcation process review task 
team with a mandate to review and monitor the processes that the MDB undertakes was 
established. However, the task team’s presence and impact has not been felt at the current 
moment. In view of the fact that no court case has been decided against the Board, it 
would seem that it has performed its mandate according to the law.      
 
There was a recent incident where the Minister of local government sought to stop the 
demarcation process in order to quell community protesters by stepping into, and putting 
a halt173  to the municipal demarcation process.174 
 
During the 2006 elections, the demarcation process resulted in the establishment of two 
new metropolitan municipalities, which were initially intended to be three.175 The Board 
decided to issue a notice at the eleventh hour, re-opening the discussion on its earlier 
                                                          
170 Robinson V ‘Cross-border dispute splits community’ Mail and Guardian 17/02/2006   
http://mg.co.za/article/2006-02-17-crossborder-dispute-splits-community 
(accessed 20/11/2013). 
171 Tabane R ‘Addressing citizen distrust’ Mail and Guardian 09/03/2012   
 http://mg.co.za/article/2012-03-09-addressing-citizen-distrust (accessed 20/11/2013). 
172 Resolutions of the ANC's 53rd national conference, Mangaung, 16-20 December 2012. 
173 Sasolburg: Board has final say on boundaries News 24 23/01/2013   
http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Sasolburg-Board-has-final-say-on-boundaries-20130123 
(accessed 20/11/2013). 
174 Patel K ‘Zamdela: A failure of the public consultation process’ Daily Maverick 31/01/2013 
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-01-31-zamdela-a-failure-of-the-public-consultation-
process#.UotLwCYaLDc (accessed 20/11/2013). 
175 Mlokoti V (2009) 4. 
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determination. It soon surfaced that it had buckled under pressure from the MEC to 
reconsider its decision about granting Msunduzi municipality a metropolitan status.176 
 
The above events indicate a worrying pattern of outside influences affecting the 
independence of the Board. Any further events of this nature will jeopardise the 
functioning of the Board.  
 
6.2 Impartiality of the Board 
The impartiality and integrity of the Board members have been questioned in various 
public platforms,177 with allegations of conflict of interest by members. The neutrality of 
the current Chairperson of the Board has been questioned, with allegations that he has 
some interest in certain municipal mergers.  
 
Although there is nothing in the Constitution and enabling legislation that stops a Board 
member from carrying on other business activities beyond the functioning of the Board, 
and as it is said that the MDB’s decisions are made by a collective, the reality is different.  
 
However continuous allegations of conflict of interest, whether real or perceived, will in 
the long run impact negatively on the credibility of Board members and the independence 
of the Board, whose reputation depends largely on the public view.  
 
However true that decisions are made collectively, the mere fact that one is appointed a 
Chairperson means that he/she holds more power than any of the Board members and the 
fact that she/he is the only full-time member of the Board means he has first-hand 
knowledge of the activities of the Board than a part-time member. The reasoning that 
decisions are made by a collective may not necessarily ring true in practice. 
 
                                                          
176 Naidoo N ‘MEC asks for rethink of metro status for Pietermaritzburg’ The Witness 
19/10/2009 http://www.witness.co.za/index.php?showcontentandglobal%5b_id%5d=29581 
(accessed 20/11/2013) 
177 SAPA ‘DA undermining MDB decisions’ Times Live 24/10/2013   
http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2013/10/24/da-undermining-municipal-demarcation-Board-
decisions (accessed 20/11/2013) 
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The MDB has done reasonably well in assisting and facilitating the MLG system. The 
Board’s constitutional mandate has been executed effectively and efficiently. The Board 
has not functioned according to the elements of good governance because, while there are 
no conflicts amongst members, the vacancy rate is problematic to a well-functioning 
institution.  
 
Financial probity has also been a problem, specifically compliance with laws and 
regulations. However, various allegations emanating from external factors such as 
political parties and communities have the ability to derail the Board’s functioning in the 
long run, and may negatively impact on the independence of the Board and thus the 
functioning of the system of MLG.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE SOUTH AFRICAN HERITAGE RESOURCES AGENCY 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999 (NHRA) whose aim is to create an 
integrated framework for the management of heritage resources in the country, calls for a 
three-tier system for heritage resources management in the Republic.  
 
The Act established the South African Heritage Resources Agency, 178  as a national 
administrative body responsible for identification and management of grade I heritage 
resources, amongst others. However, the provincial level functions are the responsibility 
of provincial heritage resources authorities (PHRAs) and local level functions are the 
responsibility of local authorities. The PHRAs are established by the Member of the 
Executive Council (MEC) dealing with Arts and culture matters of each province.  
 
However, the other spheres’ competence to carry out the functions in terms of the NHRA 
is dependent on an assessment by SAHRA in the case of PHRAs,179 and PHRAs in the 
case of local authorities,180 before there is devolution of powers and functions to the 
latter.  
 
As much as the roles of the three spheres are spelt out in the NHRA, co-operation 
between the three heritage authorities is key to ensuring service delivery to the public. 
With the establishment of the PHRAs and local authorities, comes the need to adhere to 
the principles of co-operative governance as enshrined in the Constitution. Therefore, 
whilst SAHRA may not be a direct intergovernmental relations institution, it must 
facilitate and integrate its functioning with the other two spheres and co-ordinate the 
identification and management of heritage resources.181 
                                                          
178 Hereafter referred to as SAHRA (the NHRA differentiates between SAHRA and  
 SAHRA’s Council). It is a Schedule 3A public entity in terms of PFMA, an Agency 
 of the Department of Arts and culture established in terms of Section 11 NHRA. 
179 Section 8 (6) (a) (i) NHRA. 
180 Section 8 (6) (a) (ii) NHRA. 
181 Section 8(2) NHRA.  
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The scope of SAHRA’s functionality calls for the principles of co-operative government 
and intergovernmental relations182 to be central in the performance of its mandate and 
management of the country’s heritage resources.  
 
This Chapter evaluates SAHRA’s legal framework and its leadership’s effectiveness. The 
Chapter also assesses the Agency’s administrative harmony, economical and efficient use 
of resources and execution of mandate.  
 
2. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Schedule 4A of the Constitution places cultural matters, which when broadly defined 
include heritage, under national and provincial jurisdiction. However, Schedule 5A of the 
Constitution indicates that provincial cultural matters fall within the ambit of competence 
of each province.  
 
The implication of these provisions is that both spheres may enact legislation on cultural 
matters, but provinces are limited to establishing policies, objectives and strategy plans 
for heritage resources management within their provinces.183 
 
2.1 Governance structure 
The decision-making body of SAHRA is the Council, the Councillors of which are 
appointed by the Minister of Arts and culture. Unlike the FFC and MDB, the 
independence of SAHRA’s Council is not outlined in the NHRA, but rather implied 
through its mandate and functionality. According to the NHRA the Council should 
consist of at least nine but not more than fifteen Councillors, of whom nine must 
represent each of the provinces, and the CEO. In practice, the Chairpersons of the PHRAs 
are the nine representatives from provinces.184 
 
Councillors must be appointed based on qualifications or special experience or interest in 
fields relevant to heritage resources as well as the financial knowledge needed for the 
                                                          
182 Section 41 Constitution.  
183 Section 24 (1) (g) NHRA. 
184 Meeting of the Portfolio Committee: Arts and culture (hereafter referred to as PCAC)  
on SAHRA’s annual reports 2010/11 01/11/2011 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20111102-south-
african-heritage-resources-Agency-their-201011-annual-report (accessed 20/11/2013). 
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efficient functioning of SAHRA.185 Councillors are appointed for a period not exceeding 
three years, but may be reappointed. 186  No Councillor may serve more than two 
consecutive terms.187 
 
If a Councillor dies or vacates office before the expiration of the period for which he/she 
has been appointed, another person may be appointed to fill the vacancy for the unexpired 
portion of the period for which the Councillor was appointed.188 The Minister of Arts and 
culture, after consultation with the Council, may remove a Councillor from office if 
he/she is of the opinion that there sound reasons for doing so, after hearing the Councillor 
on those reasons.189 
 
2.2 Mandate 
The Council is required to promote the co-ordination of policy formulation and planning 
for the management of the national estate at national and provincial levels,190 amongst 
others.  
 
According to the NHRA, the Council’s main functions include: hearing appeals against 
decisions of a Committee or other delegated representative of SAHRA by the SAHRA 
Council’s appeals Committee;191 identification, declaration, management and protection 
of grade I national heritage sites;192 and assessment of PHRAs to perform their functions 
in terms of the Act.193 
 
2.3 Intergovernmental relations between the three heritage authorities 
The NRHA anticipates an integrated system for heritage resources management where all 
three authorities from the spheres have clearly defined functions within their jurisdiction. 
However, the principles of co-operative government and intergovernmental relations 
                                                          
185 Section 14 (2) NHRA. 
186 Section 14 (5) NHRA. 
187 Section 14 (6) NHRA. 
188 Section 14 (7) NHRA. 
189 Section 14 (4) NHRA.  
190 Section 16 (d) NHRA. 
191 Section 49 NHRA. 
192 Sections 8(2) and 11(a) NHRA. 
193 Section 8 (6) (a) (i) NHRA.  
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should apply between the three heritage authorities. Therefore, the spheres and heritage 
entities should be assisting and supporting one another, informing one another of, and 
consulting one another on matters of common interest and co-ordinating their actions and 
legislation with one another.194 
 
Three factors necessitate cooperative government and intergovernmental relations195 in an 
integrated system for management of heritage resources and matters in the country. First, 
cultural matters which are the basis for the heritage powers and functions are a concurrent 
function of the national and provincial governments. Second, the NHRA require that 
there should be devolution of heritage functions from SAHRA to PHRA and from PHRA 
to local heritage authorities.196 Third, although there is no legislative requirement that the 
provincial representatives in SAHRA should be Chairpersons of the PHRAs, a rule of 
practice has developed which ensure that each PHRA Chairperson is a provincial 
representative on SAHRA Council.  
 
3. EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP 
Effectiveness requires that not only should there be a Council, but that the Council 
collectively makes decisions on behalf of SAHRA. The Councillors are appointed based 
on qualifications or special experience or interest in fields relevant to heritage resources 
as well as on financial knowledge needed for the efficient functioning of the Agency.197 
 
Effective leadership is linked to the Agency’s ability to execute its mandate. It is the 
ability to deliver decisions on time. This ability is influenced by the Agency having a 
Council at all times, having sufficient Councillors to carry out its tasks, and on 
harmonious relationships between Councillors.  
 
There are several information discrepancies in the Agency’s annual reports, the 
parliamentary Committee meetings and the AGSA’s reports regarding the availability of 
the Council and the number of Councillors in office during certain periods. Therefore, in 
                                                          
194 Section 41 Constitution.  
195 Section 7 (1) NHRA.  
196 Sections 4 (d), 8 (1) and 8 (6) NHRA.  
197 Section 14 (2) NHRA. 
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compiling graphs 7, 8 and 9, the author used the Agency’s annual reports as guides, but 
where there was a contradiction between them and other sources, the latter were used.  
 
3.1 Vacant Councillors’ positions 
Graph 7 below indicates the percentage of Councillors in office during various financial 
years. One hundred per cent indicates a full composition of Councillors, and nought per 
cent indicates that there was no Council appointed.  
 
However, it should be noted that certain distinct events, such as the fact that a month after 
appointment of the first Council, four Councillors were informed that the Department of 
Arts and culture had cancelled their further participation in SAHRA matters, were not 
captured on the graph. The four Councillors were not given reasons for their dismissal. It 
later became known that the Minister of Arts and culture had not authorised their 
dismissal and they resumed participation in the affairs of the Agency three months after 
appointment.198 This event was followed by what the author assumes to be resignations 
by Councillors in later years. 199  However, none of the annual reports outlines such 
resignations. 
                                                          
198 SAHRA’s annual report 2000–2001 3. 
199 SAHRA’s annual report 2002–2003 5. 
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Graph 7: Councillors' vacancy rate from 2000-2013. 
 
According to the 2006-2007 annual report, the Council had a full composition of fifteen 
Councillors.200 However, the 2007–2008 annual report indicates that no new Councillors 
had been appointed since 30 September 2006 and the Agency was left without a newly 
appointed Council.201 However, in contradiction to the former statement, the very same 
2007-2008 annual report has a list of Councillors who served during this period.  
 
The 2008–2009 appointed Council was also marred by vacant positions 202  and 
resignations,203 and it was in office for a maximum of one year.204 The Council which 
occupied office in July 2010,205 was in office eighteen months after the previous one’s 
                                                          
200 SAHRA’s annual report 2006–2007 7.  
201 SAHRA’s annual report 2007–2008 99. 
202 SAHRA’s annual report 2008–2009 4. 
203 SAHRA’s annual report 2009–2010 4.  
204 PCAC on Robben Island Museum and SAHRA on their 2009/10 annual reports  
16/11/2010 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20101117-robben-island-museum-audit-outcomes-200910-
presentation-south-african (accessed 20/11/2013).  
205 SAHRA’s annual report 2011-2012 9.  
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departure. 206  There is an indication that there was an absence of leadership around 
2012.207 The current Council, which was appointed in 2013, has thirteen members.208 
 
The information obtained on vacant positions and resignations is that they were all caused 
by non-appointment of PHRA representatives by the MECs. The general understanding is 
that the situation is a result of a lack of clarity on the role of PHRAs representatives in the 
SAHRA Council, and the lack of formal mechanism of enforcing MECs from appointing 
provincial representatives to SAHRA’s Council.209 The remuneration of Councillors has 
also been put forward as another reason for a high number of vacant positions and 
resignations amongst the Councillors.210 
 
3.2 Chairperson 
The Chairperson of the Council is elected from the appointed members of the Council 
and holds office for the period or the unexpired portion of the period for which he or she 
has been appointed as a Councillor, unless the Council otherwise determines.211 If the 
Chairperson of the Council vacates the office before the expiration of the period for 
which he was appointed, another Councillor must be elected as a Chairperson of the 
Council from the appointed Councillors.  
 
The inaugural Chairperson resigned four months after his appointment 212  but was 
replaced by another one who held office until 2006. There is an indication that no new 
                                                          
206 Meeting of SCOPA on the Department of Arts and culture, National Arts Council, SAHRA  
 2010-2011 annual reports 29/05/2012 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20120529-        
Department-arts-culture-national-arts-Council-sa-heritage-resources-a  
(accessed 20/11/2013). 
207 SAHRA’s annual report 2012–2013 10 and 14.  
208 The current Council http://www.sahra.org.za/about/sahraCouncil (accessed 20/11/2013).  
209 SAHRA’s annual report 2012–2013 12. 
210 PCAC on SAHRA’s progress: briefing 05/09/2012   
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20120905-south-african-heritage-resources-association-state-affairs  
(accessed 20/11/2013) and on SAHRA’s annual reports 2010-2011  01/11/2011 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20111102-south-african-heritage-resources-Agency-their-                        
201011-annual-  report  (accessed 20/11/2013). 
211 Section 15 (1) NHRA. 
212 SAHRA’s annual report 2000–2001 4.  
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Councillors were appointed after 30 September 2006,213 thus the same applies to the 
Chairperson position. The year 2007–2008 saw a third Chairperson appointed, who was 
in office until December 2008. From January 2009 to July 2010 there was no Chairperson 
in office. The fourth Chairperson was in office from July 2010 until July 2013, and the 
current one started in September 2013.214 
 
3.3 Productive relationship between the Councillors 
There have been several indications of non-productive and conflict-ridden relationships 
between Councillors. On being questioned by the PCAC about claims of division by 
some Councillors, a Councillor denied any division between Councillors. However, the 
very same Councillor suggested that there may be a need to look into a way to constrain 
Councillors who go astray.215 
 
There are allegations that the fourth Chairperson preferred autonomy and side-lined other 
Councillors.216 Throughout his Chairpersonship, there was never a full Council attending 
parliamentary meetings.217 This was questioned on several occasions.218 In the words of 
some of the PCAC members ‘the Chairperson seemed to have been fighting all the time 
with everyone, therefore may be the problem that needed to be replaced or the challenge 
might remain’. 219  The Chairperson of the PCAC indicated that she had received 
information about the problems within the Agency, from people within the Agency.220 
                                                          
213 SAHRA’s annual report 2007–2008 99. 
214 The current Council (accessed 20/11/2013).  
215 PCAC 05/09/2012 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20120905-south-african-heritage-    
 resources-association-state-affairs (accessed 20/11/2013). 
216 PCAC on the 2012/2013 anticipated audit outcomes of the Department: briefing by   
 AGSA; audit outcomes and turnaround strategy: briefing by SAHRA 20/03/2013  
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20130320-20122013-anticipated-audit-outcomes-Department-arts-
culture-briefing (accessed 20/11/2013). 
217 PCAC 20/03/2013 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20130320-20122013-anticipated-audit-  
 outcomes-Department-arts-culture-briefing (accessed 20/11/2013). 
218 PCAC 20/03/2013 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20130320-20122013-anticipated-audit-  
 outcomes-Department-arts-culture-briefing (accessed 20/11/2013). 
219 PCAC 05/09/2012 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20120905-south-african-heritage-  
 resources-association-state-affairs (accessed 20/11/2013). 
220  PCAC on the Department’s fourth quarter expenditure report; SAHRA on turnaround 
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However, she warned against victimising people within the Agency who had brought 
information to the Committee or who had exposed failings within SAHRA.221 
 
Most conflicts amongst Councillors involved the CEO’s office. There are allegations that 
some of the Councillors were working with a former CEO, and were trying to prevent the 
collective Council from investigating her. One disgruntled Councillor went to the Public 
Protector and the Minister of Arts and culture222  in order to stop the Council from 
questioning the validity of employment and lack of employment contract by the CEO. In 
this regard, it was mentioned that there was a Councillor who was manipulative and had 
appealed to the Minister of Arts and culture when defeated by a Council vote.223 
 
Whereas this Chapter is specifically about SAHRA, one should be mindful that there 
have been several claims of interference in the functioning of state institutions which fall 
within the Department of Arts and culture. Some of the allegations include political 
pressure brought to bear by the Minister of Arts and culture, breaches of corporate 
governance principles made with the knowledge of, and the use of Councillors by the 
Minister.224  
 
There are allegations of wrongful appointment of Councillors, threats made to, and 
disbandment of Council.225 At one state institution, there was a claim that only one 
                                                                                                                                                                             
strategy 05/06/2013 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20130605-Department-arts-and-culture-fourth-
quarter-expenditure-report-south-african-heritage-resources-Agency-turnaround  
(accessed 20/11/2013). 
221  PCAC 20/03/2013 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20130320-20122013-anticipated-audit-  
 outcomes-Department-arts-culture-briefing (accessed 20/11/2013). 
222  PCAC 05/09/2012 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20120905-south-african-heritage-  
 resources-association-state-affairs (accessed 20/11/2013). 
223  PCAC on SAHRA’s 2012 annual report 31/10/2012   
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20121031-south-african-resources-Agency-their-201112-annual-report 
(accessed 20/11/2013). 
224 PCAC on the National Heritage Council 2011 strategic plan briefing, Committee concerns   
about Pan South African Language Board 14/06/2011 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20110615-
national-heritage-Council-its-annual-report-200910 (accessed 20/11/2013). 
225 PCAC on the National Heritage Council 2011 strategic plan briefing, Committee concerns   
about Pan South African Language Board 14/06/2011 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20110615-
national-heritage-Council-its-annual-report-200910 (accessed 20/11/2013). 
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Councillor was appointed in a proper manner and another Councillor was, without the 
knowledge of management, given a contract to do the work that management should have 
been performing.226 
 
The information above indicates that the Agency has not had an effective leadership in 
place. Moreover, there have been three periods during which no Council was appointed, 
which obviously affect an institution’s effectiveness and efficiency.  
 
4. THE ADMINISTRATIVE HARMONY 
The CEO forms part of the Council.227 However, unlike other Councillors, the CEO is 
appointed by the Council itself.228 The CEO is also the accounting officer, responsible for 
the management of the Agency’s affairs and must report on those affairs to the Council as 
may be required. In terms of Section 14 (5) of the NHRA, a Councillor holds office for a 
period not exceeding three years, and may be reappointed. Therefore Section 14 (5) of the 
NHRA also applies in respect to CEO’s appointment. 
 
At its establishment, the Agency had a transitional CEO before a full-term CEO was 
appointed on a five-year contract in January 2001.229 However, the CEO did not complete 
her contract, because by October 2004 another CEO was appointed on a five year 
contract. The third appointee also left the Agency eighteen months before his contract 
expired.230 An acting CEO was appointed from April 2008 to January 2009. In February 
2009, a new CEO was appointed by Council on a three-year term, which she later argued 
to have been verbally extended to five years.231 In November 2012 an acting CEO was 
appointed. 232  
 
                                                          
226 PCAC on the National Heritage Council 2011 strategic plan briefing, Committee concerns 
 about Pan South African Language Board 14/06/2011 
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20110615-national-heritage-Council-its-annual report-200910  
(accessed 20/11/2013). 
227 Section 14 (1) (b) NHRA. 
228 Section 20 (1) NHRA. 
229 SAHRA’s annual report 2002 –2003 4.  
230 SAHRA’s annual report 2004 –2005 6.  
231 SAHRA’s annual report 2011-2012 16. 
232 SAHRA’s annual report 2012-2013 15 and 51. 
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In 2012, the then CEO challenged the expiration of her three-year term of office, on the 
basis that there was a verbal undertaking by the previous Council that it would be for five 
years. During her term of office, the CEO did not have a performance contract but only 
an employment letter.233 When the Council tried to obtain the contract, appeals were 
made to the Minister of Arts and culture, and the Council was reported to the Public 
Protector with a request that it stop investigating the validity of her contract of 
employment.234 
 
During the period 2000 to 2013 several trends have developed within the Agency. The 
NHRA states that all Councillors, which include the CEO, are appointed on a three-year 
term, but the employment contracts of all CEOs (to the exclusion of acting CEOs) have 
stipulated a five-year term, which is contrary to the three-year term mentioned in the Act.  
 
None of the Agency’s CEOs have ever completed a full-term in office. There is no 
stability in the CEO’s office, and there have been several acting CEOs who come in and 
out of office without proper official handover. These events are clear indication of 
instability in the office of the CEO, which affects institutional performance.    
 
Although a single occurrence, the verbal promise of job security to the CEO without 
going through the proper channels is worrying. Furthermore, the Agency’s recruitment 
process is questionable, considering the fact that the former CEO was the only candidate 
shortlisted for the job.235   
 
 
5. ECONOMICAL AND EFFICIENT USE OF RESOURCES 
Graph 8 below illustrates SAHRA’s audit outcomes for the period 2000 to 2013. The 
vertical axis represents audit outcomes received for each financial year. The horizontal 
                                                          
233 PCAC 05/09/2012 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20120905-south-african-heritage-  
 resources-association-state-affairs (accessed 20/11/2013). 
234 PCAC 31/10/2012 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20121031-south-african-resources-  
 Agency-their-201112-annual-report (accessed 20/11/2013). 
235 PCAC 05/09/2012 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20120905-south-african-heritage-  
 resources-association-state-affairs (accessed 20/11/2013). 
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axis represents the financial years. The audit outcomes are indicated by the thick blue line 
across the graph.  
 
 
Graph 8: The SAHRA's audit outcomes from 2000-2013. 
 
As indicated by graph 8 above, the Agency has never received a clean audit. The main 
reason for this has been non-compliance with laws, regulations and guidelines. 
 
The AGSA’s findings reveal a general pattern of lack of documentation provided for 
auditing purposes. In circumstances where documentation is disclosed, its validity, 
accuracy and completeness cannot be verified.236 Therefore, it is impossible to obtain 
sufficient appropriate audit evidence to support the amounts stated in most of the 
financial statements. 
 
Since the Agency’s inception, its major weaknesses have been its inadequate internal 
controls, management of compliance systems,237 the non-establishment of a system of 
internal audit under the control of an audit Committee,238 non-compliance with guidelines 
                                                          
236 SAHRA’s annual report 2003–2004 51. 
237 SAHRA’s annual report 2000–2001 20. 
238 Section 51 (1) (a) (ii) PFMA. 
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that pertains to procurement, contract and the supply chain management, 239  non-
disclosure and classification of information as per guidelines,240 material misstatements in 
all financial statements in the form of under-statement and over-statement of figures241 
and the late submission of financial statements.242 
 
For several years, the Agency had irregular, fruitless, wasteful 243 and unauthorised 
expenditure, as a result of not having a staff member who could monitor and control 
supply chain management procedures.244 
 
Ultimately, in 2011-2012, SAHRA obtained a disclaimer because the shortcomings and 
weaknesses from the past years had not been dealt with, and there had been the absence 
of a Council in previous years. The Agency provided insufficient evidence in the form of 
documentation on which the AGSA could base an audit opinion. The lack of sufficient 
evidence was not confined to specific amounts but represented a substantial portion of the 
information in the financial statements.245 
 
The AGSA’s assertion that supporting documentation had not been forthcoming from the 
Agency has also been confirmed by the Chairperson of the PCAC during one of the 
Parliamentary meetings.246 It was indicated that the PCAC’s request from SAHRA for 
documentation on mismanagement of funds, for the purpose of oversight was not 
forthcoming.  
 
                                                          
239 SAHRA’s annual report 2003–2004 51-52. 
240 Sections 55 (1) (a) and 55 (1) (b) PFMA. 
241 AGSA’s report 2007–2008 187. 
242 AGSA’s report 2002–2003 68. 
243 SAHRA’s annual report 2010–2011 120-122. 
244 SAHRA’s annual report 2010–2011 120. 
245 SAHRA’s annual report 2011–2012 136. 
246 PCAC on War Museum of Boer Republics, National Film and Video Foundation, Robben 
Island Museum: 2013 annual performance plans 22/05/2013 http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20130522-
war-museum-boer-republics-national-film-video-foundation-robben-island-museum-2013-annual-
performance-plans (accessed 20/11/2013). 
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6. MANDATE EXECUTION 
It has been acknowledged 247  that SAHRA has battled to implement the NHRA. 248 
Reasons such as the enactment of the NHRA without considering the financial 
implications, the insufficiency of funding,249and the broadly defined legislation have been 
put forward as justifications for the unsuccessful implementation.  
 
In this regard, an assessment of decisions made on the identification and declaration of 
national heritage sites, on the issuing of permits as well as on appeals and capacity 
assessments is undertaken as shown in graph 9 below. The horizontal axis represents the 
financial years and the vertical axis represents the number of decisions made on the 
Agency’s mandate per financial year. 
                                                          
247 PCAC on the briefing by SAHRA on the NHRA 16/08/2002   
 http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20020815-  
briefing-south-african-heritage-resource-Agency-national-heritage-resources-act  
(accessed 20/11/2013). 
248 PCAC on SAHRA’s annual report for the year ended 31 March 2001 05/03/2002   
http://www.pmg.org.za/minutes/20020304-south-african-heritage-resource-Agency-annual-report 
(accessed 20/11/2013). 
249 PCAC on the presentation by the Department on its budget 2010-2011 23/03/2010   
http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20100324-Department-arts-culture-its-budget-2010-11 
(accessed 20/11/2013). 
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Graph 9: The SAHRA's mandate execution from 2000-2013. 
 
Unlike the FFC and MDB, the Agency does not operate on a yearly reporting basis. The 
Agency’s mandate is influenced and/or triggered by an event. As an example, the permit 
issuing, appeals and assessments of PHRAs to perform their functions occurs on request 
by an applicant. However, the identification, declaration, management and protection of 
grade I heritage sites is a function that must be performed routinely.  
 
Overall, graph 9 reflects that, of the four mandates assessed, the issuing of permits was 
undertaken on an annual basis. However, graph 9 should be read with caution, because 
execution of mandate cannot occur when there is no Council in place, as was indicated 
earlier by graph 7 above.  
 
According to the Agency’s 2004–2005 annual report, in 2005 all nine PHRAs had been 
established. However, the PHRAs were not fully functional and not in a position to 
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execute some of their tasks. At present only two PHRAs are fully functional, while others 
are either completely understaffed, under-trained or lacking the staff contingent to deal 
with all aspects of the NHRA. At the present moment, only the City of Cape Town 
metropolitan municipality has applied to its PHRA for powers over grade III heritage 
resources.250 
 
During the period 2007/2008 appeals were lodged with SAHRA but because no new 
members of Council had been appointed since 30 September 2006 the appeals could not 
be concluded. The consequences of the inability to make decisions included a lapse of 
SAHRA’s provisional protection of the heritage resource, resulting in loss of formal 
jurisdiction over certain of farms. These affected the appellants’ ability to obtain 
decisions that would enable them to proceed with the developments, because SAHRA’s 
appeal Committee was non-existent for more than a year after the appeals were lodged.251 
 
With regard to the identification, declaration, management and protection of Grade I 
heritage sites, during 2007/2008, a delay in the declaration of the Table Mountain 
National Park as a national heritage site, was caused by the late appointment of SAHRA’s 
Council.252 In addition, the declaration of District Six as a national heritage site was 
delayed because there was no Council to finalise the formal processes linked to gazetting, 
which is led by SAHRA.253 
 
The available data and information indicates the Agency’s total failure to execute its 
mandate. It can be argued that SAHRA’s inability to provide services and its non-
responsiveness to the public has affected its ability to assess PHRAs’ ability to perform 
and thus it has also prevented local heritage authorities from performing their functions. 
 
                                                          
250 Wiltshire NG The use of SAHRIS as a state sponsored digital heritage repository and  
 management system in South Africa International CIPA Symposium, 2-6 September 2013,  
 Strasbourg, France 325. 
251 SAHRA’s annual report 2007–2008 99. 
252 SAHRA’s annual report 2007–2008 94. 
253 District Six Museum’s annual report 2007–2008 7. 
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The above information reflects a disregard for procedures and guidelines. This can be 
traced back to the institution’s lack of an internal audit unit to deal with internal controls, 
and other weaknesses in the system and management.   
 
SAHRA’s situation is evidence of regression in effective leadership, 254  and of non-
productive relations between the Council and the CEOs office. This is manifested by the 
uneconomical and inefficient use of resources. It is a combination of poor governance 
and operations.  
 
The Agency has been built on an institutional culture of poor performance, lack of 
accountability and disorder without consequences. On the other hand, there is merit in the 
argument that SAHRA’s problems may be a reflection of the bigger problems within the 
Department.  
 
From the look of things, the tension and conflicts between the Councillors and the CEO is 
affecting the Agency’s ability to execute its mandate as reflected by graph 9 above. This 
means that the clear lack of proper dialogue between the three heritage authorities, which 
is reflected by the challenge of getting provincial representatives into the SAHRA 
Council, amongst others, hampers the decentralisation of power to PHRAs and local 
heritage authorities.255 Clearly, the assessment and verification of provincial and local 
government’s competence to perform functions before devolution, was not undertaken 
during the absence of a Council in office. As shown, currently only one municipality has 
applied to its PHRA for powers over Grade III heritage resources and two out of nine 
PHRAs are fully functional.256 
 
  
                                                          
254 SAHRA’s annual report 2011–2012 110. 
255 Peters BG and Pierre J (2001): 29 134, Stephenson P ‘Twenty years of multi-level   
governance: ‘where does it come from? what is it? where is it going?’ (2013)  
20 Journal of European Public Policy 819. 
256 Wiltshire NG (2013) 325.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper focused on good governance within the FFC, the MDB and the SAHRA, state 
institutions which are meant to support South Africa’s system of multi-level government. 
In doing so, the elements of good governance were grouped into four thematic areas, 
namely; effective leadership, administrative harmony, economical and efficient use of 
resources and mandate execution. Using these themes, an assessment of the state 
institutions’ effectiveness and efficiency was undertaken. This Chapter provides a 
summary of the key trends observed throughout this assessment, followed by remedial 
recommendations.   
 
2. CONCLUSION 
Addressing the functionality of a state institution can only be possible if there is a system 
which monitors trends and occurrences. The monitoring encompasses availability of 
complete data, which is consistent, valid and accessible to all members of society. 
However, in the process of compiling this paper, data given by institutions and 
information contained in the annual reports was mostly inaccurate and incomplete. 
 
Regarding effective leadership, a comparative graph 10 below, with 100 per cent 
representing a full composition of leaders and nought per cent representing an absent of 
leaders, indicates that at various stages all three institutions were operating with the 
minimum required number of leaders, thereby affecting the effectiveness of these 
institutions.    
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Graph 10: A comparative graph of the FFC, the MDB and the SAHRA’s leadership 
vacancy rate. 
 
SAHRA has had three periods where no Council was appointed. Unlike the FFC and 
MDB, there were more resignations and vacant positions at SAHRA and the relationship 
between the Agency’s Councillors was found to be generally unproductive and marred by 
conflicts. There is a prevalence of appointing leaders on an acting basis at the FFC for 
extended periods.  
 
With regard to administrative harmony, the FFC operated on combined CEO/Chairperson 
roles in violation of the principles of good governance, but SAHRA had a clear 
separation of the two positions. At one point, the MDB appointed one of its own part-
time Board member as an acting CEO at the same time. However, there was stability, 
continuation and harmonious relationship between the CEOs and the Board at MDB than 
at SAHRA.   
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In respect of economical and efficient use of resources, as shown on graph 11 below, all 
three institutions have had limited clean audits. The main barrier to achieving clean audits 
was an inability to comply with laws and regulations. In the case of the FFC, there were 
minor issues, whereas SAHRA had an extreme case of non-compliance, as reflected by 
AGSA’s disclaimer audit. Overall, major institutional weaknesses were found on internal 
controls and systems which violated provisions of the PFMA, treasury regulations, supply 
chain management and preferential procurement frameworks, which resulted in 
unauthorised, irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure. 
 
 
Graph 11: A comparative graph of the FFC, the MDB and the SAHRA’s audit outcomes. 
 
With regard to the mandate execution, it was found that throughout the three institutions’ 
existence, only the FFC was able to execute its entire mandate. The MDB delivered on its 
constitutional mandate, but not on its statutory mandate and SAHRA did not execute its 
mandate.  
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2.1 Overall findings 
The problems faced by the institutions are influenced by both external and internal 
factors. In the case of external factors, the prevailing vacuum in leadership in the case of 
non-appointment and a combination of CEO/Chairperson roles which fall within the 
mandate of institutional designers or executive authorities, is concerning.   
 
However, as this study was not about external factors, but rather internal governance in 
state institutions, the overall findings were as follows:  
 
It was found that at SAHRA, the institutional flow as depicted by figure 2 in Chapter 2 is 
disconnected. The intention (mandate execution) of the institutional designer as reflected 
in the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999, was not implemented. Internal factors 
such as conflicts between the Councillors and the CEO, also added to the disturbance of 
the institutional flow. This resulted in an environment which was not conducive or 
receptive to the elements of good governance. Of concern, is that over the years, several 
forensic audit reports were undertaken at SAHRA, but no further steps were taken against 
the culprits.257   
 
However, even with problems with the appointment of leaders and the CEO/Chairperson 
combination at the FFC, both the FFC and the MDB were able to facilitate the MLG 
system.  
 
How has bad governance influenced the mandate execution and how did it impact on the 
functioning of the intergovernmental relations system? In the absence of the elements of 
good governance, which are meant to be constraints, checks and balances, there was an 
increase in unauthorised, irregular, fruitless and wasteful expenditure which resulted in 
weak institutions such as SAHRA. As a result, the allocated public resources were not 
directed to the execution of mandate, thus the non-facilitation of the MLG system, as 
evidenced by the non-operational and non-functional PHRAs and local heritage 
authorities. 
 
                                                          
257 SAHRA’s annual report 2005–2006 107-108.  
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3. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Certain recommendations can be made to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of 
state institutions to facilitate the MLG system. The recommendations seek to ensure that 
stringent measures are adopted in the appointment processes in order to minimise 
conflicts, leadership vacuum and non-compliance with laws and regulations. The 
measures must ensure that state institutions are able to function according to the 
principles of good governance. 
 
Stringent measures must be put in place to ensure that at least annual reports of the 
institutions’ state of affairs are accurate and have complete information. This 
recommendation is made in light of the difficulties experienced by the author in 
collecting data needed to analyse good governance at SAHRA and, to a degree, at the 
MDB and the FFC.  
 
Furthermore, the various Parliamentary Committees should be involved in the process of 
appointing leaders in state institutions. This will strengthen the elements of good 
governance, specifically accountability, transparency and the promotion of the right of 
access to information.258 It will also strengthen Parliament’s oversight role, and promote 
accountability to the office rather than to an individual, leading to the strengthening of the 
independency of state institutions. 
 
The executive authorities should be proactive in remedying the ills by enabling 
legislation that facilitates the institution to function effectively and efficiently. The Acts 
should set clear criteria and time limits on how, when and how long a position should be 
vacant. The provisions should be stated in a clear and mandatory language to ensure 
compliance.  
 
The main goal of the MLG system is to improve service delivery to the public through 
the three spheres of government. Without the support of state institutions in facilitating 
and assisting the MLG system, the three spheres cannot function optimally in the delivery 
of good and services. If the institutions that are meant to facilitate MLG system are 
unable to operate efficiently, the objectives of devolution will be negatively affected. 
                                                          
258 Section 32 Constitution. 
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